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Abstract
High-performance computing (HPC) systems enable scientists to numerically model
complex phenomena in many important physical systems. The next major milestone
in the development of HPC systems is the construction of the first supercomputer
capable executing more than an exaflop, 1018 floating point operations per second.
On systems of this scale, failures will occur much more frequently than on current systems. As a result, resilience is a key obstacle to building next-generation
extreme-scale systems. Coordinated checkpointing is currently the most widely-used
mechanism for handling failures on HPC systems. Although coordinated checkpointing remains effective on current systems, increasing the scale of today’s systems to
build next-generation systems will increase the cost of fault tolerance as more and
more time is taken away from the application to protect against or recover from failure. Rollback avoidance techniques seek to mitigate the cost of checkpoint/restart
by allowing an application to continue its execution rather than rolling back to
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an earlier checkpoint when failures occur. These techniques include failure prediction and preventive migration, replicated computation, fault-tolerant algorithms, and
software-based memory fault correction. In this thesis, I examine how rollback avoidance techniques can be used to address failures on extreme-scale systems. Using a
combination of analytic modeling and simulation, I evaluate the potential impact
of rollback avoidance on these systems. I then present a novel rollback avoidance
technique that exploits similarities in application memory. Finally, I examine the
feasibility of using this technique to protect against memory faults in kernel memory.
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Chapter 1
Introduction

High-performance computing (HPC) systems are a critical resource for scientists
conducting cutting-edge research. Large dedicated machines enable scientists to numerically model complex phenomena that are otherwise difficult or impossible to
study. These systems facilitate the development of scientific codes that are capable
of high-fidelity simulations of a variety of important physical systems including climate and weather in the earth’s atmosphere, combustion in next-generation engines,
and the behavior of complex pathways in biological cells [14]. Detailed simulations
of these phenomena enable scientists across many disciplines to make important scientific discoveries.
The next major milestone in the development of HPC systems is the construction
of the first supercomputer capable executing more than an exaflop, 1018 floating point
operations per second. Currently, the fastest supercomputers in the world are capable
of executing a few tens of petaflops (1015 floating point operations per second) [5].
The first system capable of exaflops, an exascale system, is projected to be available
as early as 2023 [85].
Resilience is a key obstacle to building next-generation extreme-scale systems [50,
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62]. Observations on current systems show that although there are many sources of
failure, hardware failures dominate [148, 149]. Building an exascale computer will
likely require hundreds of thousands of processors and tens to hundreds of petabytes
of memory [8]. Aggregating more and more components will increase the frequency
with which these more powerful systems experience failure. Assuming that the failure rate of each individual node is identical, then the system mean time between
failures (MTBF) is inversely proportional to the total number of nodes in the system [79, 139, 148]. As a result, next-generation systems could experience multiple
failures per hour [50].
More frequent failure may mean that many current mitigation techniques will no
longer be sufficient. Effective and efficient mechanisms for recovering from or avoiding
failures may therefore be necessary for next-generation scientific applications to make
meaningful forward progress on future systems.

1.1

Memory Faults in HPC Systems

Failures in current HPC systems are caused by many different fault types. Memoryrelated failures are one of the most frequently observed sources of node failure in
large-scale distributed systems [149]. As a result, significant effort has been devoted
to hardening applications against memory faults. The sheer volume of memory
required to build next-generation extreme-scale systems combined with device trends,
such as shrinking feature sizes, have the potential to increase the frequency of memory
faults [96, 121, 122]. As a result, current projections suggest that a memory failure
could happen as frequently as once per hour on next-generation systems [112].
Memory resilience issues may be exacerbated by attempts to address power concerns. Delivering power to next-generation systems is projected to be a significant
challenge. Even accounting for advances in technology, scaling up today’s systems to
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reach exascale could require more than 100 megawatts (MW) of electricity [44, 62].
The monetary cost coupled with the technical challenges associated with delivering
that much power make this approach infeasible. As result, the current power budget
for exascale is 20 MW [62].
Memory in large-scale systems consumes a significant fraction of total system
power. Using today’s memory technology (e.g., DDR3) to construct an exascale
system might require up to 50 MW to power the memory subsystem alone [72, 150].
Recent advances in memory technology (e.g., DDR4) are projected to reduce the
memory power by as much as half [72, 147], but significant increases in memory
efficiency will still be required to stay within the exascale power budget. However,
gains in the power efficiency of memory devices frequently come at the expense of
reliability [22, 72, 95].
Memory in HPC systems is typically partitioned between user-level applications
and the kernel. Although the kernel occupies a small fraction of the memory used
by the system, the consequences of memory failures in kernel memory are more
severe than failures that occur in application memory [55]. A failure that causes the
operating system to crash will limit the effectiveness of the many techniques that
have been developed to protect against failures in application memory. Currently,
most current HPC operating systems provide no memory protection beyond that
provided by the hardware (e.g., error-correcting codes (ECC)). However, given the
frequency of accesses to kernel memory there is evidence that failures in these regions
of memory are more common than failures in other regions of memory [87].

1.2

Handling Failures with Checkpoint/Restart

A common approach to handling faults in HPC systems is checkpoint/restart. The
basic idea is that each application process periodically saves its state, a checkpoint,
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to a persistent storage facility. On today’s systems, this frequently means writing
to a global filesystem. When a failure occurs, the system must identify a set of
checkpoints, one for each application process, that represent a consistent global state
of the system. A consistent global state means that every message in the system
that has been received by one application process has also been sent by another
application process (i.e., there are no orphan messages). A set of checkpoints is
strongly consistent if it represents a consistent global state and every message in
the system that has been sent by one application process has also been received by
another application process (i.e., there are no lost messages). After the system has
identified a set of checkpoints that satisfy this condition, each application process
restores its state from its checkpoint and resumes its computation.

1.2.1

Coordinated Checkpoint/Restart

Coordinated checkpointing is currently the most widely-used mechanism for handling
failures on HPC systems. Coordinated checkpointing works by ensuring that all
checkpoints are taken at the same logical time.1 Although coordinated checkpointing
remains effective on current systems, increasing the scale of these systems to build
next-generation systems will increase the cost of fault tolerance as more and more
time is taken away from the application to protect against or recover from failure.
In particular, increasing the number of application processes increases contention
for the parallel file system because each application process must simultaneously
write its checkpoint to the global file system. As a result, committing checkpoints
becomes more and more expensive as system scale increases. The combination of
more frequent failures and more expensive checkpoints means that at the scales
projected for the first exascale system, less than half of the system’s time may be
1 Logical

time is a temporal abstraction that allows causality relationships to be reliably
established in distributed systems, see [102].
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available for advancing an application’s computation [52, 126].

1.3

Reducing the Cost of Coordinated
Checkpoint/Restart

Based on the dire predictions of the cost of coordinated checkpoint-restart on nextgeneration systems, many approaches have been proposed to reduce its performance
impact. These include alternatives to coordinated checkpoint/restart and techniques
that correct errors as they occur, reducing the need to rollback to a previous checkpoint.

1.3.1

Improving Checkpoint Write Performance

Contention for bandwidth to stable storage is one of the principal reasons that coordinated checkpointing is projected to scale poorly. As a result, a number of approaches
to reduce the cost of writing checkpoints have been proposed. These approaches
include techniques for improving global file system performance (e.g., the Parallel
Log-structured File System (PLFS) [17]) and techniques for avoiding the global file
system altogether (e.g., by writing checkpoints to node-local memory [43, 131, 169]
or solid-state drives (SSDs) [18]).

1.3.2

Uncoordinated Checkpoint/Restart

Another approach to reducing the overhead of coordinated checkpoint/restart is to
relax the requirement that all application processes commit checkpoints simultaneously. However, without coordinating the writing of checkpoints, the system cannot
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guarantee that any set of the checkpoints taken represent a consistent global state
of the machine. The resulting phenomenon is known as the domino effect; when one
application process rolls back to an earlier checkpoint, communication dependencies
force other processes to also roll back to resolve inconsistencies. In the worst case,
the only way to reconstruct a consistent global state is to start the application again
from the beginning [46].
There are a number of techniques for avoiding the domino effect. One widelystudied approach is to assume that the application is piecewise deterministic and
augment checkpoint/restart by storing logs of messages that each process sends to (or,
alternatively, receives from) its peers. In the execution of a piecewise-deterministic
application, the only non-deterministic events are the receipt of messages; if the order
of received messages is fixed, the application is deterministic. When a failure occurs,
the failed process rolls back to its most recent checkpoint and resumes execution. As
the failed process recovers, the messages that the process received during its original
execution are replayed from the logs. If the failed application process is piecewise
deterministic, this method guarantees that it will be restored to precisely the same
state it was in when the failure occurred [46].

1.3.3

Rollback Avoidance

Rollback avoidance is the set of techniques that allow the application to continue
its execution rather than rolling back to an earlier checkpoint when a failure occurs.
Many such approaches have been proposed to reduce the performance impact of
failures on checkpoint/restart systems. These include failure prediction and preventive migration [33, 66], replication-based approaches [45, 52, 59], fault-tolerant algorithms [29, 37, 38, 86, 97], and software-based memory fault correction [57, 110, 151].
The common principle underlying these approaches is that enabling an application
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to continue executing (perhaps with some degradation) despite the occurrence or
imminence of a failure will improve its performance.

1.4

Thesis Statement

In this thesis, I examine how rollback avoidance techniques can be used to address
failures on extreme-scale systems. My hypothesis is that rollback avoidance techniques can be effectively used to address fault tolerance concerns on next-generation
systems. I evaluate this hypothesis in the following ways:
• I develop and validate an analytic model of the impact of rollback avoidance on
application performance. I use this model to evaluate the benefits of existing
fault tolerance techniques and to project the benefits of future techniques on
next-generation systems in Chapter 3. I also use this model to examine the
impact of a novel rollback avoidance technique on application performance
in Chapter 5.
• I describe and validate a simulation framework that was developed in collaboration with several colleagues. I then use this framework to examine the impact
of rollback avoidance on applications using uncoordinated checkpointing with
message logging in Chapter 4.
• I present a novel rollback avoidance technique that leverages memory content
similarity. In Chapter 5, I describe a software library for extracting memory
content similarity: the Similarity Engine. I then examine how the information
collected by this library could be exploited to avoid rollback.
• I evaluate the viability of my similarity-based rollback avoidance technique for
protecting kernel memory in Chapter 6. I examine snapshots of kernel memory
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for two popular HPC operating systems to demonstrate that memory content
similarity could also be used to avoid rollback due to failures in kernel memory.
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Chapter 2
Related Work
This chapter examines the existing research literature that is related to the research
contributions presented in this document. This examination is structured in the
following way. Section 2.2 provides an overview of the current state of research on
checkpoint/restart methods for fault tolerance. Section 2.3 describes the existing
research on the development of rollback avoidance techniques. Sections 2.4 and 2.5
describe previous efforts to model and simulate, respectively, fault tolerance mechanisms on large-scale HPC systems. Section 2.6 describes earlier attempts to exploit
similarities in memory contents. Finally, Section 2.7 examines how the contributions
of this document are novel and distinct from the existing research.

2.1
2.1.1

Terminology
Binary Prefixes

Throughout this dissertation, I use the binary prefixes defined by the International
Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) in the IEC 60027-2 standard to indicate binary
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orders of magnitude For example, a KiB is a kibibyte, 210 bytes. I extend this
notation and apply it to indicate the number of processing elements used to run an
application (e.g., 1 Ki processes is equivalent to 1024 processes).

2.1.2

Fault Tolerance

Discussing the current state of research on fault tolerance for extreme-scale systems requires first establishing a taxonomy of system misbehavior. Despite efforts
at standardization, the terms used to describe system misbehavior are not always
consistently defined in the literature (cf. [16, 70, 79, 100, 104, 123]). In this document,
I adopt the terminology proposed by Gärtner [70]. Therefore, I define a fault as the
lowest-level of misbehavior in the system. A common example of a fault is the case
of a “stuck bit”, where reading the value of a memory cell always yields the same
value regardless of the value that has been written to it. A failure occurs when the
systems deviates from its specified behavior. In this taxonomy, each failure is the
manifestation of one or more faults. Thus, a computing system is fault-tolerant to
the extent that it is able to prevent faults from leading to failures.

2.2

Checkpoint/Restart

The dominant approach to fault tolerance in today’s largest systems is checkpoint/restart.1 The basic approach underlying all checkpoint/restart protocols is to periodically capture the state of the application (a checkpoint) and write it to some form
of persistent storage. When a failure occurs, the checkpoint can be used to restart
the application without necessarily requiring it to start over from the beginning.
1 Additional

detail on the evolution and development of checkpoint/restart-based fault
tolerance techniques is available from Elnozahy et al. [46, 47].
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One of the key challenges faced by checkpoint/restart protocols is identifying a set
of checkpoints that represent a consistent global state. A consistent global state is
one in which every message in the system that has been received by one application
process has also been sent by another application process (i.e., there are no orphan
messages). A set of checkpoints is strongly consistent if it represents a consistent
global state and every message in the system that has been sent by one application
process has also been received by another application process (i.e., there are no lost
messages).

2.2.1

Coordinated Checkpoint/Restart

Coordinated checkpointing is currently the most widely-used mechanism for handling failures on HPC systems. Coordinated checkpointing works by ensuring that
all checkpoints are taken at the same logical time. The most popular approach to ensuring this condition is stop-and-sync; stop-and-sync pauses each application process
and waits for all in-flight messages to finish transmission before taking a checkpoint.
The result is a set of checkpoints that represent a strongly consistent global state.
Another less commonly used approach is the Chandy-Lamport distributed snapshot
algorithm [127]. When this algorithm is used, checkpoints are initiated by a single
application process. The initiating process transmits a marker on each of its communication channels. When a process receives a marker, it saves its current state if
it has not already done so. If the process has already saved its state when a marker
arrives on channel c, then it logs all of the messages that have arrived on c since
the process saved its state. The resulting checkpoint is the combination of the saved
state and the message logs for each application process. Every checkpoint taken in
this manner is guaranteed to represent a globally consistent state [35].
Although coordinating when a checkpoint is taken guarantees the existence of a

11

Chapter 2. Related Work
consistent set of checkpoints, it introduces additional costs as well. At the end of
each checkpoint interval, every application process attempts to write its checkpoint
to persistent storage. In current systems, the persistent storage for checkpoints is
typically a parallel file system. As a result, contention for file system resources
reduces the bandwidth available to each process and the time required to commit
a complete set of checkpoints increases. Significant effort has been dedicated to
reducing the time required to store checkpoint data.

Increasing Write Performance
One approach to reducing the cost of checkpoints is to improve the speed at which
data can be written to persistent storage. The Parallel Log-structured File System (PLFS) is an interposition layer that aims to improve checkpoint write bandwidth by arranging file system accesses to minimize contention for file system resources [17].
Another approach is to reduce contention by decentralizing the storage resources.
Diskless checkpointing improves the speed at which checkpoints can be saved by
storing the checkpoints in main memory rather than writing them to a parallel file
system.2 Plank et al. [128,129,131] proposed introducing m additional processes into
the application for the purpose of storing checkpoint parity data. In this approach,
each application process stores its checkpoint in a region of its main memory. The
additional processors store parity checkpoints: the bitwise exclusive-or of all of the
checkpoints taken by the application processes.
Alternatively, the process of computing the parity checkpoint can be tailored
to the application to leverage algorithm-specific characteristics [128]. Thus, if any
2 Although

main memory is not persistent, reasonable assumptions can be made about
the occurrence of faults in the system such that, with high probability, a process’s checkpoint data will survive the failure of the process itself.
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process fails, its checkpoint data can be reconstructed by the surviving processes.
Silva and Silva [152] refined this basic approach by eliminating the processes dedicated to storing parity checkpoints. Specifically, they evaluated two approaches:
neighbor-based checkpointing, where each process stores its checkpoint and a checkpoint from one of its neighbors; and parity-based checkpointing, where each process
stores its own checkpoint in main memory and a designated processor also stores the
parity checkpoint. Although these techniques can reduce the time required to write
a checkpoint, diskless checkpointing may also significantly increase the total volume
of memory required to run a given application.
Double checkpointing creates pairs of processors, called buddy processors, that
each store duplicates of the other’s checkpoints [43, 169]. When a failure occurs,
there is a high probability that the buddy of the failed processor survives and is able
to supply the lost checkpoint data.
The Scalable Checkpoint/Restart Library (SCR) [119] builds on these ideas to
create a system of hierarchical distributed storage for checkpoint data. The lowest
level of the hierarchy consists of node-local storage and is used to store the most
recent checkpoint. While this level of the hierarchy provides the fastest access to
storage resources, it only protects against failures that affect a small portion of the
system. Higher levels of the hierarchy store older checkpoints using more distant
storage resources that protect against failures that affect larger portions of the system.
Emerging storage technologies may also be able to improve checkpoint write performance. In particular, the speed and reliability of solid-state drives (SSDs) may
allow for node-local or rack-local persistent checkpoint storage [18]. The principal
technical challenge to this approach is that the capacity of SSDs is limited. As a
result, the viability of SSDs for local checkpoint storage is dependent on the development of effective techniques for managing their limited storage capacity.
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Reducing Checkpoint Volume
Another approach to reducing the time required to take a checkpoint is to reduce the
volume of the data that must be saved in the checkpoint. In addition to applicationdirected checkpointing [153], a number of application-independent techniques for reducing the volume of checkpoint data have been proposed. Incremental checkpointing
reduces the size of a checkpoint by only considering regions of memory that have been
modified in the interval since the previous checkpoint was taken [7, 51, 56, 132].
Using conventional file compression techniques to reduce checkpoint volume has
also been thoroughly studied [111, 120, 130, 132]. Building on this legacy, Ibtesham
et al. have undertaken a thorough examination of the viability of checkpoint compression on modern systems [88, 89]. Their work includes an analytical model for
identifying the circumstances when compression decreases checkpoint commit time.
Similar techniques have been used across processors.
The mcrEngine [90] leverages semantic information in HDF5 checkpoints to
aggregate and compress checkpoints from multiple processes. Similarly, Nicolae [124]
has developed a framework that removes duplicate memory pages from system-level
checkpoints.

Reducing Checkpoint Frequency
The overheads of coordinated checkpoint/restart may also be reduced by taking fewer
checkpoints. On systems for which the time between failures is distributed according
to the Weibull distribution, lazy checkpointing gradually increases the checkpoint
interval as the time that has elapsed since the last failure occurred increases [159].
This technique is based on the observation that for Weibull-distributed failures, the
probability of a failure decreases as a function of time. Because failures are increasingly unlikely as previous failures grow more distant in the past, the risk of lost work
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also decreases and checkpoints can be taken less frequently without significantly
degrading the application’s time-to-solution.

2.2.2

Uncoordinated Checkpoint/Restart

Many alternative approaches to coordinated checkpoint/restart have been proposed
due to projections about the prohibitive costs associated with this technique on
next-generation systems. One prominent set of alternatives is uncoordinated checkpoint/restart protocols. The motivation is that relaxing the requirement that all
checkpoints be computed at the same logical time can reduce contention for storage
resources. However, when the checkpoints are not coordinated, each time one process
rolls back to an earlier checkpoint, interprocess dependencies may force other processes to roll back as well. As a result, when a failure occurs and the failed process
restarts from an earlier checkpoint, cascading rollbacks may require the application
to start over from the beginning: the domino effect [135].
The most commonly-used antidote to the the domino effect is message logging
(see [10]). For applications that are piecewise-deterministic (i.e., given a sequence of
messages the application’s computation is deterministic), logging all sent messages
guarantees that when a failure occurs the failed process be restored to precisely the
same state it was in when the failure occurred [46]. For example, when a failure occurs, the failed process can be restarted from its most recent checkpoint and all of the
messages it received since that checkpoint was taken can be re-sent. Messages can be
logged by either the sender [171] or the receiver [93, 157]. For sender-based logging,
the logs are commonly kept in volatile memory [171]. However, for receiver-based
logging, the logs must be stored in some form of persistent storage so that when a
process fails its message logs are not lost. Additionally, messages can be pessimistically logged (i.e., logged immediately upon reception/transmission) or optimistically

15

Chapter 2. Related Work
logged (i.e., logged asynchronously after the message has been delivered) [93, 157].
An important challenge to logging application messages is the volume of data
that potentially must be stored by the system. However, for many important HPC
applications the order of messages that a given application process sends is independent of the order in which messages are received; such applications are senddeterministic [34]. Leveraging the fact that send-deterministic applications will send
the same set of messages if they are re-executed from a checkpoint can reduce the
number of messages that need to be logged by rolling back the senders of orphan
messages when a failure occurs [74].

2.2.3

Hybrid Checkpoint/Restart Methods

In addition to coordinated and uncoordinated checkpoint/restart, many hybrid approaches have also been evaluated. These approaches seek to extract the benefits
from coordination (e.g., tightly bounded recovery time) and independence (e.g., fast
checkpoint writes) while avoiding the significant costs that each may incur in isolation.

Clustering

Clustering [27, 75, 140] uses coordinated checkpoint/restart within clusters of processes to minimize message logging costs, and message logging for inter-cluster message to minimize the fraction of the system that must be rolled back when a failure
occurs. Clusters of processes can be identified by examining the volume of communication between processes [75, 140] or by considering the set of processes that may
be affected by correlated failures [27].
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Communication-induced Checkpointing
Communication-induced checkpointing exploits an application’s communication pattern to relax the strict coordination requirements of coordinated checkpointing while
avoiding the domino effect during failure recovery [9, 28, 92]. Including state information in messages that the application exchanges allows each process to determine
when a checkpoint is required to ensure the existence of a set of checkpoints that
represent a consistent global state.

Message Logging + Coordinated Checkpoint/Restart
Although message logging is most commonly associated with uncoordinated checkpoint/restart, it is also possible to use it with coordinated checkpoint/restart [48,138].
Because coordinated checkpoints limit how far the application will be forced to roll
back when a failure occurs, message logs no longer need to be written to stable
storage and may instead be maintained locally in memory. Additionally, when a
coordinated checkpoint is complete, all of the messages that are successfully received
before the checkpoint was taken can be discarded. This simplifies garbage collection
and reduces the volume of logged messages. The addition of message logging to
coordinated checkpoint/restart means that the whole system need not be forced to
roll back to its previous checkpoint when a failure occurs. As a result, the system
may be able may be able to take checkpoints less frequently.

2.3

Rollback Avoidance

Techniques for handling faults in large-scale systems can be grouped into three broad
categories: failure avoidance, failure effect avoidance, and failure effect repair [32].
Failure avoidance techniques use prediction to forecast when a failure is likely to
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occur and, based on this prediction, take action to minimize the impact of the failure
on the application. For example, sophisticated analysis of system logs may provide
enough advance notice to allow the processes threatened by an imminent failure to
be migrated to safer hardware resources [66]. Failure effect avoidance techniques
allow the application to continue to execute despite the occurrence of failures. This
category includes fault-tolerant algorithms, replication, and software-based memory
fault correction. For example, two matrices that are being multiplied together can
be augmented with redundant data that allows the contents of the matrices to be
reconstructed if a failure occurs [86]. Finally, failure effect repair techniques restore
normal execution after the application has been compromised by a failure. The
most widely-studied method in this category is checkpoint/restart and its variants.
Rollback avoidance is the union of the first two categories: failure avoidance and
failure effect avoidance.

2.3.1

Failure Prediction

Several techniques have been proposed that seek to proactively avoid faults that may
occur in the future. These approaches monitor the state of the system to predict
where and when a fault will next occur. When a fault is predicted to affect a
hardware resource, all of the application processes that depend on that resource can
be migrated to other hardware resources.
Several methods have been proposed for predicting faults. One approach to
predicting faults is system log analysis. Fu and Xu [63] have proposed using a neural
network trained with failure data extracted from system logs to forecast future faults.
By extracting spatial and temporal correlation data from the system log, they can
accurately predict when and where faults are likely to occur in the future. Gainaru
et al. have proposed treating system log events as temporal signals [65]. Using this
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approach, they are able to identify likely future faults by looking for anomalies in
the signals (e.g., changes in frequency or amplitude) generated by the system log.
The authors subsequently combined this approach with data mining techniques to
correlate outliers in the signals they analyze [66].
Another approach to fault prediction is to monitor the state of the hardware using
sensors that collect data such as fan speeds, voltage levels and chassis temperature.
Wang et al. have proposed using the data generated by these hardware sensors to
predict and avoid failures [161]. For example, when the chassis temperature exceeds
an established threshold, failure of the processes that rely on hardware in that chassis
is likely. Litvinova, Engelmann, and Scott have extended this technique to more
effectively predict failures by considering temporal trends in the data generated by
the hardware sensors [113].

2.3.2

Replicated Computation

All fault tolerance requires some form of redundancy [70]. One approach to introducing redundancy for fault tolerance is to explicitly replicate computation. In this
approach, the application performs each step of its computation two or more times.
Periodically, the states of the computations are compared to determine whether an
error occurred. Ensuring that each computation will arrive at the same answer in a
failure-free environment requires that the application guarantee that for a given set
of inputs, each thread of computation will end up in the same state.
The ROAR project replicates application processes on multiple threads of a single
processor [146]. Periodically, the states of the replicated threads are compared;
divergence among the threads indicates that an error occurred. Similarly, EDDI
uses the compiler to replicate individual instructions [136]. To minimize interference,
each set of instructions uses a unique set of registers and memory locations. At pre-
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determined synchronization points, the values computed by each set of instructions
are compared to determine whether an error has occurred.
These methods protect against errors that are transient or affect a small portion
of the system (e.g., a single register or the state of a single process). To protect
against faults that may affect an entire node, several methods of replicating application processes have been proposed. A common approach to process replication is to
use features of MPI to facilitate communication between replicated processes. This
approach requires that the application be piecewise deterministic (i.e., the application’s computation is deterministic for given a sequence of messages).
rMPI [52] and MR-MPI [49] exploit the MPI profiling interface (PMPI) to protect
against fail-stop faults. The PMPI interface allows these methods to ensure that
messages are delivered to the intended application process as well as its replica.
When a single process fails, the state of the replica is up-to-date and can be used
to continue the computation. To protect against undetected failures, RedMPI [60]
compares the contents of messages sent by each application process and its replica(s).
If a process receives a different message from the application process and its replica,
then an otherwise undetected error has occurred.

2.3.3

Software Methods for Memory Failure Detection and
Correction

Large-scale systems commonly incorporate some form of hardware protection (e.g.,
error-correcting codes) to protect against frequent memory failures. Numerous software techniques for augmenting or replacing this hardware protection have also been
evaluated.
Shirvani et al. have proposed a software library that can be used in place of

20

Chapter 2. Related Work
hardware memory protection [151]. By modifying an application to access memory
through their API, they track the application’s memory usage and interpose the computation of codewords. Periodically, their library uses these codewords to validate
the contents of the application’s memory. Similarly, Yoon et al. have proposed a
technique that allows for software control of error detection [167]. They propose new
hardware that enables software to dynamically adjust the degree to which memory
is protected against errors.

Not all memory errors can be detected by existing hardware. When undetected
errors occur, they may invalidate the results generated by an application. This phenomenon, known as silent data corruption, is particularly troubling because the end
user has no way of knowing that something untoward has befallen their application.
LibSDC attempts to mitigate the effects of silent data corruption by computing
checksums of memory pages and configuring them as read-only [58]. This allows
it to determine whether the contents of the page have changed since it was last
explicitly written. When the application attempts to write to a read-only page, a
segmentation fault occurs and LibSDC restores the access protections of the page to
allow the application to write to the memory normally. After the page is written,
the memory is no longer protected against silent corruption. As a result, LibSDC
periodically re-protects memory. Berrocal et al. have proposed an algorithm-agnostic
technique that identifies memory corruption by tracking the evolution of the values of
the application’s data [19]. This approach makes predictions about future values of
the application’s data. Significant differences between the prediction and the actual
value suggest that the application’s memory has been corrupted.
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2.3.4

Algorithm-Based Fault Tolerance

In addition to the algorithm-independent techniques described above, numerous
methods for exploiting algorithm characteristics have been proposed. For example, Huang and Abraham introduce a method for adding fault tolerance to matrix
operations [86]. By augmenting matrices with checksum vectors before performing
a given matrix operation (e.g., multiplication), their algorithm is able to determine
whether the result of the operation is correct or whether an error occurred. Chen
and Dongarra extend this idea and propose an encoding that also allows data lost
due to failures to be recovered by the surviving processes [38]. In addition to these
fault tolerance techniques that are entirely contained within an algorithm, Bridges
et al. have proposed a method by which the generalized minimal residual method
(GMRES) can be modified to cooperate with the operating system to protect against
memory errors [29].

2.4

Modeling Fault Tolerance

Young [168] used a simple model of application execution with coordinated checkpoint/restart to derive the value of the optimal checkpoint interval. The application
is divided into a series of alternating intervals in which either the application is executing or a checkpoint is being saved. Daly [42] extends this model by introducing
restart time, i.e., the time that elapses from the point of a failure until the application is ready to resume execution. Oldfield et al. [126] further extended this model
to consider the impact of filesystem performance characteristics on application execution time. Similarly, Wingstrom [33, 164] presented a model of waste time (i.e.,
time not available for application computation) based on Young’s original model.
This model includes restart time but does not account for failures that occur during
a restart interval.
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As discussed in Section 2.3, many approaches for avoiding rollback have been
proposed. In addition, several approach-specific models have been developed to
evaluate the performance impact of these approaches on applications running on
extreme-scale systems. For example, Ferreira et al. constructed a probabilistic model
for process-level replication in the context of high-performance computing [52]. Using
this model, they showed where in the exascale design space replication outperforms
traditional coordinated checkpoint restart to a parallel filesystem.
Cappello et al. used the Wingstrom model of waste time to evaluate the performance impact of proactive migration and preventive checkpointing [33]. Gainaru et
al. incorporated precision and recall into the model to evaluate the effectiveness of
using signal processing to predict failure [66]. Aupy et al. used the model to examine
the impact of fault prediction on preventive checkpointing [15].
These models do not, however, account for the performance impact of uncoordinated checkpoint/restart. Few general models of the impact of uncoordinated
checkpoint/restart on application execution time exist (see e.g., Bosilca et al. [23]).
Moreover, the models that do exist do not account for the impact of communication
dependencies of each application process. This is an important omission for two
reasons. First, uncoordinated checkpoint/restart allows decisions about the timing
of checkpoints to be made locally.3 As a result, when one process decides to take a
checkpoint, it may delay its communication with other processes.4 Like operating
system noise [53, 82], these delays may propagate and impact application execution
time in a way that it is difficult to capture in an analytic model. Second, when a
3 For

some bulk synchronous parallel (BSP) applications, it may be possible to implicitly
coordinate their checkpoints [68]. However, applications that implicitly coordinate the
timing of their checkpoints may not be able to realize the full benefit of uncoordinated
checkpoint/restart because they may still experience significant contention for bandwidth
to persistent storage.
4 This phenomenon has a much smaller impact when coordinated checkpoint/restart is
used because delays due to checkpointing activities are coordinated across processes. As a
result, inter-process timing is largely preserved.
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failure occurs, the surviving processes can continue to make progress unless and until
they have a dependency on the failed process. In many current bulk synchronous
parallel (BSP) applications, the amount of progress that the surviving processes are
able to make is likely to be small. However, important applications (e.g., S3D [77])
are emerging for which global synchronization is infrequent [36, 69].

2.5

Simulating Fault Tolerance on Large-scale
Systems

Fault tolerance for HPC has been a very active area of research, but few tools exist that project behavior beyond small-scale systems. Simulating fault tolerance
techniques requires an appropriate level of detail about the communication of the
target application. Without an accurate representation of application communication, simulators cannot accurately account for the performance of some fault
tolerance techniques (e.g., asynchronous checkpointing). Too much detail, on the
other hand, unnecessarily reduces simulator performance. The application simulators for fault tolerance that do exist tend to fall to either extreme; either they are
not communication-accurate or they simulate communication in greater detail than
necessary.
Riesen et al. present a simulator that models the impact of node failure on application performance in the context of traditional coordinated checkpoint/restart [139].
This simulator can also account for process replication.

Tikotekar et al.

pro-

pose a similar approach [158]. They present a simulator that models coordinated
checkpointing and can also simulate fault prediction and process migration. While
these tools have been shown to be effective for their stated purposes, they are not
communication-accurate. As a result, they are unable to account for fault tolerance
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techniques whose performance may be influenced by communication patterns.

At the other extreme is xSim [21]. xSim builds on the MPI profiling interface
and interposes itself between the application and the MPI library. As a result,
the simulator is able to run unmodified HPC applications. Scaling is achieved by
oversubscribing the nodes of the system used for validation. While this provides a
tremendous amount of detail about the performance of the application, it imposes a
significant cost. Due to limits on the degree of oversubscription, large-scale systems
are required to simulate systems that approach extreme-scale. Moreover, as the size
of the simulated system grows and the degree of oversubscription therefore increases,
the time required to simulate the system grows dramatically. Lastly, this oversubscription could place significant limits on the size of the problem that can be solved
as the memory for each simulated node must exist in the memory of one physical
node.

Boteanu et al. present a fault tolerance extension to an existing simulator in [24].
However, they target a datacenter environment where each job is a discrete unit that
is assigned to a single processing element.

Finally, SST/macro [6, 91] is a coarse-grained, lightweight simulator designed to
simulate the performance of existing and future large-scale systems. By collecting
traces of application execution, SST/macro is able to simulate the application’s computation and communication patterns at scales and on hardware that does not yet
exist.
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2.6

2.6.1

Memory Content Similarity

Memory De-Duplication in Virtualization

Memory content similarity has been most thoroughly explored in the context of
data de-duplication. The preponderance of the relevant research on memory deduplication has been in virtualization. The Disco VMM [31] introduced transparent
memory sharing to reduce virtual machine memory consumption by exploiting memory content similarity. By intercepting disk requests that DMA data into memory,
the Disco VMM consolidated read-only pages (e.g., text segments of applications,
read-only pages in the buffer cache5 ) containing data from the disk across virtual
machines. In some cases, this approach allowed the Disco VMM to significantly reduce memory consumption. For example, transparent memory sharing allowed the
VMM to reduce the total memory consumed by 8 VMs, each running the same guest
OS and workload, by more than half.
More recently, VMware ESX server incorporated a broader approach to memory
de-duplication. Instead of intercepting disk requests, Waldsburger proposed identifying all pages in a virtual machine by their contents. When any two pages are found
to have the same contents, the pages are consolidated using copy-on-write (COW).
Applying this approach to systems running as many as 10 identical VMs running the
SPEC95 benchmark on Linux, the VMware ESX server is able to reduce memory
consumption by nearly 60%.

5 Although

the function of the buffer cache has since been folded into the page cache,
this term reflects the time period in which the paper was written

26

Chapter 2. Related Work

2.6.2

Other Uses of Memory De-Duplication

In addition to virtualization, content duplication has been effectively exploited in
other domains. In the context of data storage, reducing storage requirements in
primary and archival data storage applications by eliminating duplicate data blocks
has been widely studied, see e.g., [134, 166, 170]. Similarly, Nicolae [124] developed
a technique for eliminating duplicate memory pages in checkpoint data before it
is written to persistent storage. Kernel Shared Memory (KSM) allows duplicate
memory to be consolidated in Linux with or without virtualization [12].

2.6.3

Internode De-Duplication

Xia and Dinda have advocated for broadening the scope of sharing in virutalization to consider internode sharing. To evaluate the feasibility of this approach, they
consider the prevalence of duplicate pages between nodes running several HPC applications. For some workloads (notably HPCCG), they observe that significant interand intra-node sharing opportunities exist. Inspired by these results, Xia and Dinda
constructed a service, ConCORD, that tracks duplicate memory pages in distributed
systems [165]. By providing an interface by which duplicate memory pages can be
identified, ConCORD facilitates the development of new system services, e.g., collective checkpointing. Similarly, SBLLmalloc has been used to demonstrate that
memory consumption can be significantly reduced by consolidating duplicate pages
in the application memory of several HPC applications [20]. In several cases, this
approach yields memory savings in excess of 50%.
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2.6.4

Exploiting Similar Memory Pages

Memory de-duplication research has considered consolidating only duplicate pages.
The Difference Engine [76] introduced the idea that similar pages could also be
consolidated. In this context, two pages are similar if the difference between them
can be represented by an xdelta patch file that is smaller than 2 KiB. By relaxing the
requirement that only duplicate pages be consolidated, the authors show that under
some e-commerce workloads, the Difference Engine can extract significantly more
memory savings than VMware ESX server. Moreover, they show that the Difference
Engine can reduce memory consumption by more than 50% even for VMMs hosting
a single VM. The data presented in [76] were collected by modifying a Xen VMM
and using it to host virtualized workstations running workloads consisting of a mix
of web and database server and compilation benchmarks.

2.7

Chapter Summary

This chapter surveyed the existing literature on fault tolerance, modeling rollback
avoidance, simulation of fault tolerance mechanisms, and exploiting memory content
similarity. Despite the extensive body of research on addressing failures in large-scale
distributed systems, fault tolerance remains an important issue for next-generation
systems.
In this thesis, Chapter 3 begins by introducing a model for predicting the impact
of rollback avoidance and coordinated checkpointing on large-scale distributed systems. As discussed in Section 2.4, several models of application performance have
been proposed, see e.g., [33, 42, 168]. My model, an extension of the model proposed
by Young and refined by Daly, also accounts for the impact of rollback avoidance.
Unlike models that are specific to a particular rollback avoidance technique (e.g.,
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fault prediction [15, 66]), my model provides a framework for directly comparing
rollback avoidance techniques with a common set of assumptions.
Chapter 4 considers how rollback avoidance may impact the performance of applications when uncoordinated checkpoint/restart is used for fault tolerance. While
high-quality models of coordinated checkpoint/restart exist, no such models exists for
uncoordinated checkpoint/restart. As a result, I present a novel simulation framework based on LogGOPSim that allowed me to conduct an inquiry into the relationship between rollback avoidance and uncoordinated checkpoint/restart. This is
not the first simulator capable of modeling large-scale application performance (cf.
[21,24,91,139]), but unlike earlier approaches it considers how communication dependencies in the application interact with uncoordinated checkpoint/restart activities.
Finally, Chapters 5 and 6 present a novel technique for exploiting memory content similarity to improve application, and potentially also operating system, fault
tolerance. Although memory content similarity has been exploited for several purposes (e.g., reducing memory consumption [20,31], eliminating redundant checkpoint
data [124]), this thesis is the first to examine how similarities in memory can be exploited for fault tolerance. Additionally, this approach can be used to complement
many of the fault tolerance techniques discussed in Section 2.1.
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Modeling the Impact of Rollback
Avoidance and Coordinated
Checkpoint/Restart on
Application Performance

3.1

Introduction

As described in Chapter 1, rollback avoidance is the set of techniques that enable
an application to continue executing (perhaps with some degradation) despite the
occurrence or imminence of a failure. These techniques typically rely on reducing
checkpointing costs by significantly reducing the frequency with which the application is forced to roll back to a previous checkpoint. Analysis of these techniques is
difficult, however, for two reasons: (i) checkpoint/restart costs vary non-linearly with
system mean time to interrupt (MTTI) [42]; and (ii) these techniques frequently can
mitigate only a subset of system failures (e.g., memory corruption) [29]. As a result,
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the suitability of these techniques in exascale systems is not always clear.
To address this problem, this chapter presents a general model for analyzing the
performance impact of techniques for avoiding failure. The contributions of this
chapter include:

• A general conceptual model that captures the key features of rollback avoidance
techniques: the ability to avoid rollback and the overhead of doing so;

• Two analytic models of the impact of failure avoidance on application performance, one when failure avoidance is used in conjunction with coordinated
checkpointing and one when failure avoidance is used as replacement for coordinated checkpointing;

• Case studies mapping the performance of both replication and fault prediction
techniques to this model; and,

• An analysis of when rollback avoidance techniques are viable either on their
own or in concert with coordinated checkpoint/restart in next-generation HPC
systems.

The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 introduces
the analytical models and Section 3.3 provides validation of these models against a
previously validated simulator. Sections 3.4 and 3.5 describe two case studies using
these models: process replication and failure prediction, respectively. Section 3.6 uses
these models to analyze the effectiveness of failure avoidance both with and without
checkpointing and how the performance of these techniques drive the requirements
of future systems, and Section 3.7 summarizes the chapter.
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3.2

An Analytical Model of Rollback Avoidance

Several models exist for specific rollback avoidance techniques (e.g. [52, 66]), but not
for rollback avoidance in general. A general analytical model of rollback avoidance is
important for understanding the strengths, limitations, and tradeoffs involved with
these techniques. Because these techniques are frequently used in concert with other
techniques, for example checkpoint/restart, understanding their general behavior
tradeoffs can provide important guidance on the design of next-generation systems. It
can also guide research on current and future rollback avoidance techniques, providing
information about the best way to address resilience challenges.

3.2.1

Developing a Model of Rollback Avoidance

I begin by a developing a general conceptual model of rollback avoidance. In this
model, rollback avoidance is stochastic and can be defined in terms of two characteristics: (i) the ability to avoid rollback; and (ii) the overhead costs. When a
failure occurs, a rollback avoidance technique prevents the application from experiencing the failure with probability pa , the rollback avoidance probability. I assume
that failures are exponentially distributed. The inter-occurrence time of each of the
failures that result in rollback despite the best efforts of these techniques is a sum
of exponentially distributed variables. Because the number of consecutive of failures
for which rollback is avoided is geometrically distributed, the resulting sequence of
failure inter-occurrence times is also exponentially distributed [156, p. 320]. The
mean of the resulting distribution is the effective system MTTI (M 0 ) and is shown
in Equation 3.1. The derivation of this expression is shown in Appendix A.1.
M0 =

Θ
1 − pa

(3.1)
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where
Θ = native system MTTI
pa = rollback avoidance probability
Overhead is modeled as an extension of the application’s solve time. Rollback
avoidance overhead (oa ) describes the overhead cost as a fractional increase in solve
time due to a rollback avoidance technique. This fraction represents the expected
increase in solve time due to the overhead imposed by rollback avoidance, including
preparation for future failures, migration to avoid imminent failures, and application
degradation (e.g., slower rate of convergence) due to partial correction. However, it
does not include time spent recovering from a failure for which rollback could not
be avoided. I assume that the application is otherwise unperturbed. The resulting
expression of the application’s solve time (Ts0 ) is shown in Equation 3.2.
Ts0 = Ts (1 + oa )

(3.2)

where
Ts = application’s native solve time
oa = overhead of rollback avoidance
To understand how these parameters map to rollback avoidance techniques, consider two examples: repairing memory errors and proactive process migration. When
an ECC error is detected in memory, the memory controller raises a machine check
exception (MCE) in the processor. Current HPC operating systems terminate the
offending process or reboot the entire node in response to a MCE. However, some
proposed techniques allow detected memory errors to be corrected by either using
application knowledge [29,73] or by leveraging redundant information in the application’s memory [110]. In these cases, pa is the probability that a memory error can be
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corrected such that the application can continue without experiencing a failure and
rolling back. The overhead, oa , of these techniques is the expected value of the sum
of the additional time that is necessary to prepare for failure and the time required
to recover from memory errors as they occur.
Another approach to rollback avoidance is to proactively migrate processes away
from hardware that is predicted to fail. A common approach is to continuously
examine system event logs looking for sequences of log entries that are believed to
be indicative of impending failure [65]. Health monitoring data can also be used to
determine when a particular node is likely to fail based on environmental observations
(e.g., temperature, input voltage, etc.) [161]. In both cases, pa is equal to the recall of
the prediction mechanism. Recall captures the fraction of failures in the system that
are correctly predicted. The overhead, oa , of these techniques is comprised of two
principal components: (i) the cost of the prediction mechanism, including gathering
and processing the information necessary to make predictions; and (ii) the cost of
migrating processes following the prediction of a failure, including costs due to false
positives.

3.2.2

Augmenting Coordinated Checkpointing

This general conceptual model facilitates an analytical model of the impact of rollback avoidance techniques on application performance when used in conjunction with
traditional coordinated checkpointing. Specifically, Daly’s model1 of application performance [42] can be extended to account for rollback avoidance by modifying the
system’s mean time to interrupt (MTTI) and the application’s solve time to account
for the impact these techniques have on application performance. The resulting ex1 This

conceptual model could be used to extend any accurate application performance
model. I chose Daly’s because it is accurate and widely accepted.
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pression for application runtime (Tw ) is shown in Equation 3.3.2 Because rollback
avoidance effectively increases the system’s MTTI, the optimal checkpoint interval
also increases.
0 R/M 0

Tw (pa , oa ) = M e



e

(τ0opt +δ)/M 0 )

 T0
− 1 0s
τopt

(3.3)

where

R = time to required to restart a failed node
M 0 = system MTTI with rollback avoidance
(see Equation 3.1)
δ = checkpoint commit time
τ0opt = optimal checkpoint interval computed using M 0
Ts0 = solve time of the application (see Equation 3.2)

3.2.3

Replacing Coordinated Checkpointing

It is also instructive to consider how effective rollback avoidance would need to be
in order to be a viable replacement for coordinated checkpoint/restart. Combining the conceptual model of rollback avoidance and Daly’s model of coordinated
checkpoint/restart yields the model of rollback avoidance in the absence of check2 Although

lim

pa →1.0

Tw is undefined for pa = 1.0, the model is correct in the limit:

 0
 T0
0
0
0
M 0 eR/M e(τopt +δ)/M ) − 1 0 s = Ts
τopt

The mathematical basis for this assertion is presented in Appendix A.2.1.
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point/restart shown in Equation 3.4.3 .
0

0

0

Tw (pa , oa ) = M 0 eR/M (eTs /M − 1)

(3.4)

where
R = time to required to restart a failed node
M 0 = system MTTI with rollback avoidance
(see Equation 3.1)
Ts0 = solve time of the application (see Equation 3.2)

3.3

Validation

This section validates the accuracy of the two models introduced in the preceding
section. It accomplishes this by comparing the application runtime predicted by
the model to the application runtime predicted by a validated and freely available
simulator [52,115,139]. Because the simulator did not originally account for rollback
avoidance, I modified it to ignore failures on simulated nodes with probability pa .
Following a node failure, the interarrival time of the next failure is the sum of the
interarrival times of the failures that are successfully avoided and the interarrival
time of the next failure that cannot be avoided.
Figure 3.1 shows a comparison between the model of the impact of failure avoidance and coordinated checkpointing (Equation 3.3) and the modified simulator. To
minimize the modifications to the simulator, the simulator’s computation of the
3 As

with the previous model, Tw is undefined when pa = 1.0. However, the model is
again correct in the limit:
0

0

0

0

lim M 0 eR/M (eTs /M − 1) = Ts

pa →1.0

The mathematical basis for this assertion is presented Appendix A.3.2
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Figure 3.1: Validation of the model for augmenting C/R. These figures show the
results of validating the analytic model of the performance impact of augmenting
coordinated checkpoint/restart with rollback avoidance on application performance
against an existing simulator [52, 139]. I modified the simulator to account for rollback avoidance. The model and the simulator use identical values for the solution time (Ts = 168 hours), the checkpoint commit time (δ = 5 minutes) and node
MTBF (Θn = 5 years). Both use the optimal checkpoint interval (τopt ). The subfigures of this figure compare the results across several values of pa and oa . The values
predicted by the model and the simulator error differ by less than 1% in all cases.

optimal checkpoint interval is unmodified. As a result, for the purposes of this comparison, I modified the model such that it computed the checkpoint interval based
on the system MTTI without rollback avoidance. Each of the three subfigures show
the results for a different pair of values for oa and pa . In each case, the application
runtime predicted by the model closely matches (within 1%) the value predicted by
the simulator.
Figure 3.2 shows a comparison between the model of the impact of rollback avoidance (Equation 3.4) and the modified simulator. Once again, each of the three subfigures show the results for a different pair of values for oa and pa . In each case, the
application runtime predicted by the model closely matches (within 2%) the value
predicted by the simulator.
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Figure 3.2: Validation of the model for replacing C/R.. Validation of the analytic
model of the impact of replacing coordinated checkpoint/restart with rollback avoidance on application performance against an existing simulator [52, 139]. I modified the simulator to account for rollback avoidance. The model and the simulator use identical values for the solution time (Ts = 168 hours) and node MTBF
(Θn = 5 years). The subfigures of this figure compare the results across several values of pa and oa . The values predicted by the model and the simulator error differ
by less than 2% in all cases.

3.4

Case Study: Process Replication

To demonstrate the power of these analytical models, I use it to examine an existing process replication library, r MPI [52]. r MPI is a user-level MPI library that
facilitates process replication in HPC systems by ensuring that each process and its
replica receive all application messages even if one of the processes fails.

3.4.1

Model Parameters

Modeling r MPI requires appropriate values for the overhead (oa ) and the avoidance probability (pa ). Naively, the overhead is equal to the overhead of replicating
messages. Because each process and its replica run simultaneously, the application’s
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time-to-solution could be accurately modeled. However, this underestimates the cost
of replication. To more completely account for the cost of replicating every process,
oa must be at least 1.0. In this case, the model will not yield raw execution time;
it measures resource usage in terms of the number of node-hours required for the
computation.
The runtime overhead of r MPI is generally less than 5%, depending on the application [52]. Because this overhead affects each process and its replica, the overhead
is captured by setting oa = 1.10. The probability of avoiding the effects of a failure
by using r MPI is given by the birthday problem [52]. On average, the number of
faults that will occur before the application observes a node failure (i.e., a process
and its replica are down simultaneously) is given by Equation 3.5.
r
πn 2
+
F (n) ≈
2
3

(3.5)

where n is the total number of nodes that comprise the system. The probability
of correcting any single failure can be derived from this expression and is shown
in Equation 3.6.
√
√
3 πn − 2
√
pa (n) = √
3 πn + 2 2

(3.6)

The remainder of the model parameters are duplicated from the evaluation of r MPI.
A summary of the model parameters is shown in Table 3.1.

3.4.2

Model Performance

Given the model and this set of parameters, the efficiency of process replication
can be compared against the efficiency of coordinated checkpoint/restart. Figure 3.3
shows the system efficiency as a function of system size both with and without process
replication. The key observation is that this figure closely matches the data collected
in the evaluation of r MPI (cf. Figure 7 in Ferreira et al. [52]). For small systems, the
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Parameter
Ts
Θn
δ
R
oa
pa

Description
solve time
node mean time to interrupt (MTTI)
checkpoint commit time
restart time
rollback avoidance overhead
probability of rollback avoidance

Value
168 hours
5 years
15 minutes
15 minutes
1.10
see Equation 3.6

Table 3.1: Model parameters for examining the performance of process replication.
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Figure 3.3: Comparison of application efficiency with and without process replication.
The results obtained using our approach-independent model closely match existing
data on process replication (see Figure 7 of Ferreira et al. [52]). These data were
collected using the parameters in Table 3.1.
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overhead of replication is prohibitive. However, as system size increases and failures
become more likely, replication is more efficient than the baseline approach.

Case Study: Fault Prediction
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Figure 3.4: Impact of failure prediction on the fraction of waste time. Waste time
is all of the application’s execution time that is not spent doing useful work. Impact of failure prediction on the fraction of waste time (i.e., time spent not doing
useful work). These result closely match existing modeling and simulation data for
exponentially distributed failures (cf. [15] : compare the good predictor results to
the red line in Figure 3(b); compare the bad predictor results to the red line in Figure 4(b) [15]). These data demonstrate that the model is capable reproducing key
results in the field while being general enough to account for additional important
scenarios.

Techniques for predicting the occurrence of failures have been widely studied [64–
67, 142]. Accurately predicting failures before they occur may allow the system to
take corrective action that could prevent the application from being compromised.
The benefit of this family of approaches is typically characterized by recall : the
fraction of the total number of failures that can be predicted. In terms of the model,
pa is equal to the method’s recall. There are two principal costs of failure prediction:
(i) runtime overhead (ort ), the costs associated with processing system information
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(e.g., collecting and analyzing system log files); and (ii) false positive overhead (of p ),
the costs associated with unnecessarily initiating proactive response (e.g., needlessly
migrating a process). As shown in Equation 3.7, the false positive overhead can be
expressed in terms of the recall and precision of a given prediction method.
of p =

(1 − P )R
c
PM

(3.7)

where
P = precision of the prediction method
R = recall of the prediction method
c = average time required for a proactive response
M = system MTTI
As a result, the overhead of failure prediction can be expressed as shown in Equation 3.8.
oa =

(1 − P )R
c + ort
PM

(3.8)

where
ort = runtime overhead of the prediction
method expressed as a fraction of total execution time
Figure 3.4 compares the results of the model to existing data on the impact
of fault prediction on application performance [15]. Specifically, it compares two
specific cases of predictor performance. Figure 3.4(a) shows the fraction of waste
time (i.e., time spent by the system doing something other than directly advancing
the application’s computation) for a “good” predictor (P = 0.82, R = 0.85) as a
function of system size. Figure 3.4(b) shows the same result for a “bad” predictor
(P = 0.4, R = 0.7). These results demonstrate that the model closely matches
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existing modeling and simulation data on the the impact of fault prediction (cf. [15]:
compare the red lines in Figure 3(b) to the good predictor results (Figure 3.4(a)),
and the red lines in Figure 4(b) to the bad predictor results (Figure 3.4(b))). The
results are similar when the model is used to reproduce the other figures presented
by Aupy et al. that assume exponentially distributed failures. Although the rollback
avoidance model is technique-independent, it yields results that closely match the
results of this technique-specific model.
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Figure 3.5: Impact of precision and recall on application speedup. This figure shows
that the performance impact of fault prediction is much more strongly influenced
by recall than precision. These results were generated using a solve time (Ts ) of
168 hours, a system MTTI (M ) of 45 minutes, a checkpoint commit time (δ) of 15
minutes, and a restart time (R) of 10 minutes. Speedup is calculated relative to the
execution time with no rollback avoidance.

The rollback avoidance model also allows the claim—first articulated by Aupy
et al. [15]—that recall is more important than precision for fault prediction to be
more closely examined. Figure 3.5 shows the relative impacts of precision and recall
on application performance. For the data in this figure, the system MTTI (M ) is
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Figure 3.6: Comparison of the relative impact of precision and recall on application
speedup. These figures confirm that precision has much less impact on application
performance than either recall or runtime overhead.

fixed at 45 minutes, a value that is well within the range currently projected for
the first exascale machine. The proactive response cost is fixed at two minutes.
While this value is longer than the prediction window of current techniques, it is also
shorter than most current proactive measures (e.g., checkpointing) would require
(cf. [65]). The data in this figure show that above a modest threshold (e.g., 50%—
many modern methods are above 90%), precision has relatively little influence on
application execution time.
Figure 3.6(a) illustrates the impact of precision relative to runtime overhead.
The data in this figure were collected with the recall value fixed at 40%—a value
achieved by many current methods. Each of the lines in this figure corresponds to
a different precision, ranging from 25% to 95%. These four lines almost entirely
overlap one another. Although the existing literature is largely silent on the costs
of predicting failures, this figure shows that runtime overhead has a much larger
effect on application runtime than precision does. Moreover, in this configuration,
once the runtime overhead exceeds 20% the benefits of failure prediction disappear
and application execution time increases. Finally, the impact of runtime overhead
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is significant. Below 20% the slopes of these lines are nearly -1; any increase in the
runtime overhead results in a commensurate increase in execution time. As a result,
efforts to improve precision that result in increases in the runtime overhead will yield
little benefit.
Figure 3.6(b) shows the impact of recall relative on runtime overhead. The data
in this figure were collected with the precision value fixed at 95%. Similar to the
previous figure, each of the lines in this plot correspond to a different recall value. If
we consider horizontal slices of this figure, increasing the recall value may be fruitful
even if it results in relatively large increases in the runtime overhead. For example, a
method for which the runtime overhead is 0% and the recall is 50% would yield the
same speedup as a method for which the runtime overhead is 17.8% and the recall is
75%. In other words, any method that increases the recall value from 50% to 75%
and imposes a runtime overhead of less than 17.8% will yield a benefit. This figure
shows that innovative techniques that increase recall—even at the cost of runtime
overhead—may increase the overall benefit of failure prediction.

3.6
3.6.1

Analysis & Discussion
Designing Rollback Avoidance for Exascale

Due to the projected overheads of coordinated checkpoint/restart at extreme-scale,
significant effort has been devoted to developing new rollback avoidance techniques.
In particular, considerable attention has been paid to application-specific techniques.
This section uses the model to explore the projected design space of the first
exascale system to determine where new application-specific techniques may offer the
greatest benefits. The analysis begins by examining how the relationship between
the avoidance probability and the runtime overhead affects application performance.
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Figure 3.7: Application speedup as a function of overhead and probability of rollback
avoidance. This figure shows the potential application speedup (i.e., the relative
reduction in application execution time) for several hypothetical rollback avoidance
techniques as a function of the overhead imposed by the technique. For comparison,
the dashed horizontal lines correspond to the speedup achieved by existing techniques. These results were generated using a solve time (Ts ) of 168 hours, a system
MTTI (M ) of 45 minutes, a checkpoint commit time (δ) of 5 minutes, a restart
time (R) of 10 minutes, and no runtime overhead (oa = 0.0). Speedup is calculated
relative to the execution time with no rollback avoidance.

For many application-specific methods—fault-tolerant algorithms, for example—the
overhead represents how much longer the computation takes to converge than if no
error had occurred. Figure 3.7 shows the application speedup for several avoidance
probabilities as a function of overhead. By way of comparison, the dashed horizontal
lines in this figure show the speedups that can be achieved using existing application-
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Figure 3.8: Comparison of a strawman rollback avoidance technique to three existing techniques. This figure shows heatmaps that show the potential benefit of a
strawman rollback avoidance technique (pa = 0.80, oa = 0.10) relative to three existing application-independent techniques. Each of these heatmaps covers the range
of MTTI (M ) and an aggregate checkpoint commit bandwidth (β) that is currently
projected for exascale. This figure assumes a system comprised of 128Ki nodes, each
of which has 8 GiB of memory. These figures collectively show that this aggressive
strawman would only improve application performance over a fraction of the exascale
design space.

independent techniques. Even if they impose relatively large overheads, there is room
for application-specific techniques to outperform existing techniques if they can avoid
a high percentage of rollbacks due to all sources of failure. For the application-specific
methods that can only avoid rollbacks that result from a subset of system failures,
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Figure 3.9: Effect of rollback avoidance probability and system reliability on application speedup. This figure shows the effect of a range of rollback avoidance probabilities on application speedup as a function of system reliability. These results
were generated using a solve time (Ts ) of 168 hours, a checkpoint commit time (δ)
of 5 minutes, a restart time (R) of 10 minutes, and no runtime overhead for rollback avoidance (oa = 0.0). Speedup is calculated relative to the execution time with
no rollback avoidance. “Maximum Speedup” represents the maximum increase in
application performance that can be achieved by eliminating all wasted time.

achieving such high avoidance probabilities will be challenging.
Figure 3.7 represents a single point in the exascale design space. To evaluate the
potential benefits over the entire design space, I consider a strawman. The strawman
is able to avoid 80% of all rollbacks while imposing a 10% overhead. This is an
aggressive strawman given that many application-specific techniques only protect
against rollbacks caused by memory corruption, which is a fraction of all rollbacks.
Given this strawman, I compare its relative performance to three existing techniques:

• Replication. I consider the case where each process is replicated exactly once;
the replication degree is 2. Additionally, I assume a perfectly strong scaling
application (i.e., running the same application with process replication requires
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Figure 3.10: Impact of overhead and probability of rollback avoidance on application
speedup. These results were generated using a solve time (Ts ) of 168 hours, a system
MTTI (M ) of 45 minutes, a checkpoint commit time (δ) of 5 minutes and a restart
time (R) of 10 minutes. Speedup is calculated relative to the execution time with
no error correction. For comparison, the performance of several rollback avoidance
techniques are shown: r MPI, process-level replication for HPC [52] (pa = 0.99,
oa = 1.1); ELSA, log-based prediction library [65] (pa = 0.43, oa = 0.05); and
FlipSphere, software-based error correction library for HPC [57](pa = 0.45, oa = 0.4).

twice as much time).
• Fault prediction (ELSA). ELSA is a fault prediction toolkit with a precision of
93% and a recall of 43% [65]. Although the runtime overhead of ELSA has not
been publicly documented, I assume that it is no more than 5%.
• FlipSphere. FlipSphere is a software-based memory error correction library. It
protects 90% of application memory and imposes an overhead of 40%. Because
FlipSphere only protects against rollbacks that are due to memory corruption,
its protective benefit is less than the fraction of memory that it protects. I
generously assume that 50% of all rollbacks are due to some form of mem-
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Figure 3.11: Impact of fault tolerance techniques on application performance as a
function of system MTTI. This figure compares three different approaches to fault
tolerance: (i) Coordinated Checkpointing only; (ii) Augmenting Checkpointing with
Rollback Avoidance (pa = 0.25 / oa = 0.10); and Rollback Avoidance only (pa =
0.99 / oa = 0.00). The results in this figure were generated using a solve time (Ts )
of 168 hours, a checkpoint commit time (δ) of 5 minutes, and a restart time (R) of
10 minutes.

ory corruption. As a result, the analysis in this section uses pa = 0.45 for
FlipSphere.
Figure 3.8 shows the results of the comparison of the strawman to these three
techniques. In these heat maps, the blue regions are where the strawman provides
little or no improvement, the red regions are where the strawman offers significant
benefits. These figures indicate that the benefits of this strawman depend on where
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in this design space the first exascale system appears. For systems with small MTTI
and small checkpoint bandwidths, replication will outperform the strawman. For
systems with large MTTI and large checkpoint bandwidths, fault prediction will
outperform the strawman. However, somewhere between these two extremes in the
design space there appears to be a significant opportunity for rollback avoidance
techniques such as the strawman to provide significant benefits.

3.6.2

Replacing Coordinated Checkpoint/Restart

In principle, rollback avoidance could also be used as a replacement for coordinated
checkpointing. However, for any rollback avoidance to be an effective replacement,
its probability of avoiding rollback would have be very close to 1.0. To see why this
is, consider a technique that avoids 90% of rollbacks on a system with an MTTI of 1
hour. In this case, the effective MTTI given by Equation 3.1 is 10 hours. Given exponentially distributed failures, the probability of completing a 168-hour job without
encountering a failure (which is the criteria for success in this case) is approximately
5.0 × 10−8 . Figure 3.11 illustrates this phenomenon more concretely. Even a hypothetical rollback avoidance technique that avoids 99% of rollbacks and imposes no
overhead cannot compete with coordinated checkpoint/restart in all circumstances.
In particular, for values of system MTTI below one hour this hypothetical replacement technique is no longer competitive with traditional coordinated checkpointing.
Therefore, the model shows that rollback avoidance alone is unlikely to perform well
on exascale systems.

3.6.3

Assessing the Impact of Model Parameters

The model for predicting application performance also allows for a careful exploration
of the design space for rollback avoidance techniques. Examining the characteristics
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that have the greatest impact on application can inform the design, development,
and refinement of current and future rollback avoidance techniques. This section
considers the impact of three of the model’s parameters: (i) probability of rollback
avoidance (pa ); (ii) rollback avoidance overhead (oa ); and (iii) system MTTI (M ).

Probability of Rollback Avoidance

Combining rollback avoidance techniques and coordinated checkpoint/restart has the
potential to improve application performance by reducing the frequency with which
the application is forced to roll back to a previous checkpoint. I begin by considering the impact that the probability of rollback has on application performance.
Figure 3.9(a) shows the decrease in application runtime (i.e., speedup) as a function
of the system MTTI for several values of pa . To isolate the impact of pa , this figure
examines the impact of approaches that impose no overhead (i.e., oa = 0.0). To put
the system MTTI into context, a system MTTI of 0.5 hours corresponds to a system
comprised of 65,536 (64Ki) nodes, each with an MTTI of 3.75 years. Similarly, a
system MTTI of 8 hours corresponds to a system comprised of nodes whose MTTI
is 60 years. These two values roughly represent the range of node MTTIs that are
currently projected for the first exascale system [50].
The most striking feature of this figure is how unreliable the system must be before
even very good rollback avoidance techniques (e.g., able to avoid rollback 80% of the
time) significantly improve application performance. For systems with an MTTI
greater than 8 hours, there is very little speedup in application runtime. This is an
especially stark result given that these figures assume zero overhead. However, for
unreliable systems (e.g., systems with an MTTI that is less than 2 hours) rollback
avoidance yields significant benefits, in some case reducing the application runtime
by more than 81%.
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The reason for this behavior is due to a phenomenon that is closely related to
Amdahl’s Law [11]. An application that runs on a system with an MTTI of eight
hours operates with an efficiency of 85%. In other words, 85% of the system time
required to run the application is used to perform useful work. A direct consequence
of this fact is that the maximum possible speedup is approximately 18% (1.00/0.85).
The dashed curve in Figure 3.9 shows the maximum speedup as a function of system MTTI. This curve represents the maximum application speedup that could be
achieved if all wasted time (e.g., writing checkpoints, restarting nodes, redoing lost
work) was eliminated. Until the system MTTI drops below approximately 8 hours,
even heroic efforts to eliminate wasted system time will yield only modest gains in
application speed.
Figure 3.9(b) shows the overall overhead of fault tolerance. Even though each
of these avoidance probabilities achieves significant speedup over coordinated checkpoint/restart, the overhead of fault tolerance is still significant. Moreover, once the
fault tolerance overhead exceeds 100%, dual process replication will outperform these
less protective strawman approaches.

Rollback Avoidance Overhead
Figure 3.10 considers the impact of the overhead of rollback avoidance techniques
on application performance. It shows the relationship between the probability of
avoiding rollback and the overhead that avoidance imposes on the application. This
figure considers a case where the efficiency of the application with checkpoint/restart
is low: the system MTTI is low (45 minutes) and the checkpoint commit time is high
(15 minutes). Although these values are well within the range projected for the first
exascale system, they represent a system in which less than half of the application’s
runtime is available for useful computation. This figure also demonstrates the importance of minimizing the overhead of rollback avoidance for techniques that only avoid
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a modest fraction of failures. For example, a technique that imposes a 20% overhead
will not improve application performance unless it is able to avoid more than 23%
of all failures. In contrast, reducing the overhead to 10%, shows improvement when
avoiding just 12% of failures. For techniques that avoid a large fraction of failures
(e.g., more than 70%), overhead has a lesser impact; even when overhead consumes
a significant fraction of the application’s system time, there is application speedup.

System MTTI

As observed earlier, system MTTI has an (unsurprisingly) large impact on the effectiveness of rollback avoidance mechanisms. To isolate the effects of system MTTI
and to reduce the number of dimensions in the configuration-space, consider three
representative approaches to fault tolerance: (i) coordinated checkpoint/restart only;
(ii) coordinated checkpoint/restart augmented with a rollback avoidance technique
for which the probability of failure avoidance is 25% and the overhead is 10%; and
(iii) a rollback avoidance technique that is able to avoid 99% of all failures with 1%
overhead. All other parameters are taken from Table 3.1. Figure 3.11 shows the
performance of these three approaches as a function of system MTTI, ranging from
30 minutes to 64 hours. The approach that yields the best application performance
depends on the which of three different regions of system MTTI that a given system
is operating in. In the configuration shown in this figure, augmenting coordinated
checkpoint/restart with rollback avoidance is the most effective approach for unreliable systems, those with an MTTI below approximately 81 minutes. For reliable
systems, those with an MTTI above approximately 2.9 hours, the rollback avoidance
technique by itself is most effective. Coordinated checkpoint/restart is the preferred
approach in a small range of system MTTI values between these two extremes.
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3.7

Chapter Summary

This chapter introduced and validated two analytical models for evaluating the impact of rollback avoidance on application performance in large-scale systems. These
models allow rollback avoidance to examined both in conjunction with coordinated
checkpointing and in isolation. Using these models, I examined the impact of failure
avoidance techniques based on system characteristics. In particular, I showed that
for reliable systems, using rollback avoidance to augment checkpointing yields only
modest performance gains. However, as systems grow in size and failures occur more
frequently, rollback avoidance can yield significant improvements. I also showed that
even very effective rollback avoidance techniques are unlikely to replace coordinated
checkpointing unless future systems are much more reliable than currently projected.
More broadly, these models allow for an exploration of system and application parameters for which rollback avoidance can potentially provide significant benefits.
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Simulating the Impact of Rollback
Avoidance and Uncoordinated
Checkpoint/Restart on
Application Performance

4.1

Introduction

As described in Chapter 1, coordinated checkpoint/restart is currently the dominant approach to fault tolerance on today’s largest systems. Uncoordinated checkpoint/restart with message logging has emerged as a potential alternative. One of
the key benefits of uncoordinated checkpoint/restart is that relaxing the coordination
requirement reduces contention for bandwidth to persistent storage thereby allowing
checkpoints to be written more quickly.
Analytic models that can accurately account for the impact of communication dependencies on uncoordinated checkpoint/restart do not exist. Therefore, I developed
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a simulation framework to examine the impact of uncoordinated checkpoint/restart
and rollback avoidance on application performance in collaboration with Kurt Ferreira, Dorian Arnold, Bryan Topp, and Torsten Hoefler. The approach to simulation
is motivated by two observations: (1) simulation can be computationally expensive,
and simulation efficiency is maximized by considering only the features of the computing environment that are relevant to the performance impact of checkpoint/restart;
and (2) the coarse-grained operation of checkpoint/restart (on the order of minutes
to hours) allows the overheads and complexities of cycle-accurate simulation to be
avoided. Based on these observations, we hypothesize that like operating system
noise [53,82], resilience mechanisms (e.g., writing checkpoints, restarting after a failure or redoing lost work) can be modeled as CPU detours. A CPU detour is a number
of CPU cycles that are used for something other than the application.
This chapter presents an approach to efficiently simulating checkpoint/restartbased fault tolerance for large-scale HPC systems. Using this approach, it introduces a framework for simulating the performance impact of coordinated and uncoordinated checkpoint/restart protocols on existing and hypothetical extreme-scale
systems. This framework allows the impact of rollback avoidance and uncoordinated
checkpoint/restart on application performance to be examine. Specific contributions
in this chapter include:
• A survey of system, application, failure, and resilience characteristics required
for accurate and efficient simulation of workloads running on extreme-scale
systems;
• A simulation framework, based on extensions to LogGOPSim [83];
• An evaluation of the predictive performance of the simulation approach against
an existing analytic model of coordinated checkpoint/restart; and
• An examination of the impact of rollback avoidance and uncoordinated check-
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point/restart on application performance
The organization of this chapter is as follows: the next section discusses the
relevant system, application, failure and resilience characteristics that must be accounted for by the simulation framework. This section also offers background on
checkpoint/restart protocols and shows how they factor into the considerations. Section 4.3 provides an overview of LogGOPSim, the simulator that serves as the basis of
the framework. Section 4.4 describes how the simulator models failures and rollback
avoidance. Section 4.5 validates the accuracy of the predictions of the simulation
framework. Section 4.6 presents the results of using the simulator to examine the impact of rollback avoidance on uncoordinated checkpoint/restart. Finally, Section 4.7
summarizes the contributions of this chapter.

4.2

Considerations for Resilience at Scale

To enable efficient, large-scale simulations of resilience techniques, this section identifies the relevant hardware and software characteristics that impact simulation performance. It also examines how system features, application behavior, fault-tolerance
mechanisms, and failures impact application performance.

4.2.1

Hardware Characteristics

One of the objectives of this chapter is to develop a simulation framework that will
enable the evaluation of resilience techniques on current and future systems. As a
result, the simulator must be able to accurately and efficiently model the impact
of faults and fault tolerance on application performance given the: (a) temporal
scale, (b) spatial scale, and (c) architectural features of next-generation extremescale systems.
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Temporal Scale
Faults and fault tolerance mechanisms typically operate at large time-scales (for
example, minutes, hours or even weeks). As discussed in Chapter 1, projected meantime-to-interrupt (MTTI) on the first exascale machines are on the order of hours.
Additionally, many of the target applications are long running, and the behaviors
of the applications as well as the systems are expected to be dynamic. As a result,
simulating resilience requires a simulator that can model relatively long periods of
application execution.

Spatial Scale
Currently, the largest HPC systems are comprised of tens of thousands of nodes. If
current predictions hold, the first exascale system may be nearly an order of magnitude larger. As a result, the simulator must be capable of modeling the behavior of
systems that are much larger than any that are currently available.

Architectural Features
The first exascale system is not projected to appear until sometime after 2020 [154].
In the intervening span of years, improved interconnect and persistent storage technologies are likely to emerge. The simulator must therefore also be able to evaluate
the impact of these advances on resilience mechanisms.

4.2.2

Application Characteristics

The simulator must be capable of accounting for the performance aspects of an application’s behavior. Prior research and experience has shown that it may be sufficient
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to do this at the coarse granularity of the target application’s computation, specifically: its communication graph, a description of how processes communicate with
each other; its computation time, the time between communication events; and its
dependencies, a partial ordering of all communication and computation events. The
next section examines the interplay of these characteristics and resilience mechanisms.

4.2.3

Impact of Checkpoint/Restart Mechanisms

Despite the proliferation of checkpoint/restart-based resilience mechanisms [9,56,71,
117,118,128,131,152], effective methods for evaluating the true costs of each of these
approaches on exascale systems do not exist [163]. Given the large temporal and
spatial scales of the simulated systems that we wish to consider, effective simulation
demands the elimination unnecessary detail. Existing work on modeling and simulation of coordinated checkpointing provides a guidepost on the required components
and level of details [26, 42, 139].
In a failure-free environment, the impact of coordinated checkpointing can be
accurately modeled by considering the following application and system characteristics:
• checkpoint time, the amount of time that checkpointing activities prevent the
application from executing. The checkpoint time can be broken down into the
time required for the following phases:
– coordination phase
– checkpoint calculation phase, during which time the checkpoint data are
computed; the checkpoint commit phase, during which the checkpoint data
are written to stable storage; and the resumption phase, during which the
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system resumes normal application execution.

• checkpoint interval, time between consecutive checkpoints

• work time, the amount of time that the application would execute in the absence
of checkpointing activities.

For approaches like uncoordinated checkpointing that lack explicit coordination,
the simulator also needs to consider application characteristics such as the communication characteristics described earlier in this section. Consider a simple uncoordinated checkpointing strategy where each process generates checkpoints strictly according to local policies. Communication dependencies may cause the checkpointing
activities of one process to perturb the behavior and performance of other processes.
For example, if the recipient of a message is currently busy generating a checkpoint
then reception of the message may be delayed until the checkpoint is complete. Further, all actions that are dependent on the reception of the message will also be
delayed. Additionally, many asynchronous resilience techniques incorporate some
form of message logging [46] to mitigate recovery costs. Simulating the impact of
this activity also requires that the simulator account for application communication
patterns.

4.2.4

Impact of Failures

Meaningful evaluation of resilience mechanisms necessarily includes consideration of
failures. To accurately simulate the impact of failures on application performance
the simulator must consider: (a) failure characteristics; (b) restart time; and (c) the
recovery model.
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Failure Characteristics
To evaluate the impact of faults in the context of a resilience mechanism, a description
of how failures occur in the simulated system is required. Initially, we consider only
fail-stop failures. Although the occurrence of failures in the system could be expressed
in many ways, the most common and succinct description of failure occurrences is in
the form of a probability distribution.

Restart Time
When a failure occurs, some time elapses before any computation can be undertaken
on the failed node. To accurately capture this behavior, the simulator must know the
time between the occurrence of a failure and the moment when the failed node can
resume computation. This includes time to restart failed nodes and processes and to
read checkpoints from persistent storage, but does not include any time for recovery.
For example, in the case of coordinated checkpointing, the end of the restart interval
coincides with the beginning of rework (i.e., redoing work lost due to the failure).

Recovery Model
When the failed node has restarted and is able to resume computation, there is
typically some amount of work that needs to be redone before the system can again
make meaningful forward progress. For example, in coordinated checkpoint/restart,
all of the computation between the last valid checkpoint and the occurrence of the
failure needs to be redone. Typically, each resilience mechanisms presents a different
method for recovering from a failure. Therefore, to accurately account for the cost of
recovering from a failure, the simulator needs a model for each resilience mechanism
that allows it to determine the amount of time that will elapse before the application
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Required to Model Parameter Name
coordination
time
All
checkpoint
Checkpointing
computation
checkpoint
commit time
checkpoint
interval
work time

Parameter Description
time for processes to coordinate the
taking of a checkpoint
time to compute a checkpoint
time to write a checkpoint to stable
storage
time between consecutive checkpoints
time-to-solution without failures or resilience mechanisms
details of inter-process communication

Uncoordinated
Checkpointing

communication
graph
computation
events
dependencies

Failure
Occurrences

failure
characterization
restart time
recovery model

failure-free computation pattern of
the application
partial ordering of communication and
computation events
rate and distribution of failures
time to read a checkpoint from stable
storage after a failure
a model of the time required before
forward progress can resume

Table 4.1: Summary of the parameters needed for accurate simulation of HPC applications in a failure-prone system.

resumes forward progress.

4.3

LogGOPSim

This section describes LogGOPSim [81, 83], the simulator we extend to meet the requirements prescribed by the considerations in Section 4.2. We choose LogGOPSim
because it has been shown to be accurate, is freely available, and is fast enough to
support large-scale simulations while capturing many of the application and hard-
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ware characteristics we require. As described in the next section, we simply needed
to extend it to account for checkpoint/restart and failure recovery.

4.3.1

Simulating Application Characteristics

LogGOPSim [83] is an application simulator based on a variant of the LogP model
of parallel computation [41]. The simulation framework consists of two major components: a trace collector (liballprof), and an optimized discrete-event simulator
(LogGOPSim). The trace collector records the sequence of MPI communication operations executed by the target application. The discrete-event simulator uses the
MPI traces to extract the required communication and computation characteristics
of the application while preserving the happens-before relationship of events within
the application.
This simulation framework was developed to simulate applications at scale, and
has the ability to simulate large-scale systems by extrapolating traces that were collected on smaller scale systems. This allows for the simulation of platforms that are
larger than those currently in existence while maintaining the same communication
characteristics (equivalent to weak-scaling of the application). Although the extrapolated trace may not precisely represent the communication pattern on the larger
system, the impact of this inaccuracy has been shown to be small [83] if extrapolation
factors are bounded. This framework has been used to evaluate the performance of
collective communication operations [84] and the impact of OS noise [82] on largescale applications.

4.3.2

Simulating Hardware Characteristics

LogGOPSim is able to simulate systems with the hardware characteristics described
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in Section 4.2. First, it provides the simulation scale necessary for evaluating checkpointing techniques. For a single collective operation, LogGOPSim can simulate up to
10,000,000 processes. For more general workloads, it is capable of simulating more
than 64,000 processes.
Second, with some minor modifications, LogGOPSim is also capable of simulating
the necessary temporal scale. The initial implementation of LogGOPSim was intended
for comparatively short simulations. As a result, the temporal scope of the simulations that can be executed by the unmodified simulator was significantly limited by
the size of the simulating system’s memory. To achieve the necessary temporal scale
with reasonable quantities of system memory, we made some simple modifications to
the way that LogGOPSim handles trace data.
Third, LogGOPSim is able to model the impact of emerging interconnect technologies. Modifying the parameters of the underlying LogGOPS model enables
LogGOPSim to simulate the impact of many changes in network behavior on resilience
techniques. In addition, as discussed more fully below, this model of resilience mechanisms allows for the evaluation of how improvements to persistent storage systems
(e.g., the widespread availability of node-local or rack-local SSDs) will affect the
performance of resilience mechanisms.

4.4

Simulating Failures and Resilience
with LogGOPSim

We use LogGOPSim to simulate activities associated with checkpoint/restart (e.g.,
writing checkpoints, restarting after a failure, redoing lost work) by modeling them as
CPU detours. A CPU detour is a number of CPU cycles that are used for something
other than the application, similar to OS noise [53, 82]. To do so, we modified
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LogGOPSim to generate a sequence of CPU detours that represent checkpoint/restart
activities. The duration and frequency of the CPU detours are determined by four
user-specified parameters:
• MTTI, the mean of the exponential distribution that represents the time to
the next interrupt;
• restart time, the amount of time that elapses between the occurrence of a failure
and the moment when the application is able to resume computation;
• checkpoint time (δ), the total time required to generate a checkpoint (including
interprocess coordination) and write it to persistent storage; and
• checkpoint interval (τ), the amount of time that elapses between checkpoints.
In the case of coordinated checkpoint/restart, the user can choose to have LogGOPSim
compute the optimal checkpoint interval based on the other three parameters rather
than explicitly specifying the checkpoint interval.
We have also added support to LogGOPSim for simulating rollback avoidance. The
user can specify the desired rollback avoidance characteristics using the two parameters introduced in Chapter 3: probability of rollback avoidance (pa ), the stochastic
description of when the application avoids rollback; and overhead of rollback avoidance (oa ), the degree to which the application’s execution time is inflated by the
activities of the rollback avoidance technique.
Every τ seconds, LogGOPSim simulates the end of a checkpoint interval and generates a detour of δ seconds to represent the time taken away from the application to
take a checkpoint. When a failure occurs, as determined by the MTTI, LogGOPSim
determines the amount of time that was lost due to the failure and generates a corresponding detour. This includes time for: restarting and resuming computation
(including time lost to failed restarts), incomplete checkpoints, and lost work.
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This chapter examines two checkpoint/restart-based fault tolerance protocols: coordinated checkpoint/restart and uncoordinated checkpoint/restart with optimistic
message logging. For the case of uncoordinated checkpoint/restart with optimistic
message logging, the application is assumed to have a very high bandwidth connection to persistent storage and that the time required to write to the message log is
negligible. To consider the case where this assumption does not hold, LogGOPSim
could be modified to generate message logging detours. Similarly, pessimistic message logging [46] can be accounted for by modifying the CPU overhead parameter
(o in the LogGOPS model) for send operations (os ) to account for the log write to
stable storage.

4.5

Validating LogGOPSim’s Simulation of
Checkpoint/Restart

4.5.1

Validating Simulation of Error-Free Execution

This section presents the data collected to validate the simulator against error-free
application performance. It validates the simulator against both analytic models
and small-scale testing to ensure that the simulator accurately models the impact of
resilience mechanisms in failure-free and failure-prone environments.
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Figure 4.1: Validation of the simulator against the simple analytic model described
in Equation 4.1 for coordinated checkpointing to stable storage in a failure-free environment for CTH and LAMMPS. The model and the simulator use identical values
for the Ts (for each application), τ, and δ. The simulation error is less than 3% for
CTH and less than 1% for LAMMPS across the tested node count range.
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Analytic Model of Coordinated Checkpointing in a Failure-Free
Environment
Equation 4.1 models application performance in terms of its wall clock time-tosolution, Tw , in a failure-free environment.
δ
Tw = Ts 1 +
τ


(4.1)

where Tw is the wall clock time, Ts is the solve time of the application without any resilience mechanism, τ is the checkpoint interval [42], and δ is the checkpoint commit
time (time to write one checkpoint). In the case of coordinated checkpoint/restart,
all application processes are assumed to be writing to a shared persistent storage
resource and contention for storage resources is assumed not to degrade the aggregate write bandwidth to the shared storage resource. Given these assumptions, the
checkpoint commit time can be expressed as:
δ=

N
1X
ci
β i=1

(4.2)

where N is the number of application processes, ci is the size of the checkpoint for the
ith process, and β is the aggregate write bandwidth to stable storage. If checkpoints
are roughly the same size for each process, then Equation 4.2 simplifies to:
δ≈

N c0
β

(4.3)

Equation 4.3 implies that the checkpoint commit time is roughly proportional to
the total number of application processes. Each doubling of the number of processes means that the time to commit a checkpoint to persistent storage also roughly
doubles.
Figures 4.1(a) and 4.1(b) compare the completion time predicted by this model
to the completion time predicted by the simulator. The times-to-solution for CTH
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predicted by the simulator are very accurate, about 3% greater than the model’s
predictions. More importantly, the simulator closely matches scaling trends predicted
by the model. Moreover, the simulated times-to-solution for LAMMPS are within
1% of the analytic model. On the whole, these data suggest that the simulator is
accurately modeling how the impact of checkpoint/restart scales with system size.
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Figure 4.2: Validation of LogGOPSim simulation against a coordinated and uncoordinated checkpointing library for CTH. The simulator and libchkpt use identical
values for Tw (failure free performance), τ (checkpoint interval), and δ (checkpoint
commit time). The simulation error in this figure is less than 20%, with this differences attributed to platform features not being simulated. For example, interference
from the OS is not being generated in this case to simplify analysis. This OS interfere
has been shown to greatly influence impact CTH performance [53].
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Figure 4.3: Validation of LogGOPSim simulation against an coordinated and uncoordinated checkpointing library for LAMMPS. The simulator and libchkpt use identical
values for Tw (failure free performance), τ (checkpoint interval), and δ (checkpoint
commit time). The simulation error in this figure is shown to be less than 5% in the
range tested.
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Small-scale testing

To further validate the simulator, we compared its predictions against the results
of small-scale tests on real hardware. The simulator provides fine-grained control
over the checkpoint interval and duration. To mimic this degree of control on real
hardware, we constructed an MPI profiling library, libchkpt. This library, based on
the the libhashckpt incremental checkpointing library [56], includes support for full
coordinated and uncoordinated checkpoints in addition to its support for incremental
coordinated checkpoints. The full coordinated checkpointing functionality ensures
all checkpoints are taken simultaneously on each node, while the uncoordinated approach takes checkpoints independently. While taking checkpoints, the CPU is taken
from the application until the checkpoint commit time has completed.
Figures 4.2 and 4.3 show the results of the validation experiments. These figures compare the total wall clock time simulated by LogGOPSim and measured with
libchkpt running on a test platform. For reference, each figure also includes the total wall clock time in the absence of any failures. Each figure also shows the error in
the simulator’s predicted execution time. Note the performance of CTH in Figure 4.2
exhibits a distinct sawtooth pattern. This pattern is an artifact of how CTH scales
the computation as nodes counts increase. The simulator accurately predicts this
complex sawtooth pattern. This figure the error in the simulator’s prediction. The
predictive performance of the simulator is less accurate for CTH than for LAMMPS,
but the error in the predicted time to solution is less than 20% in both cases. The
size of the error in the predicted execution time for CTH is likely due to the fact that
these experiments do not account for OS noise and they rely on a very simple network
model that does not account for contention. CTH has been shown to be sensitive to
this sort of perturbation [53]. Because CTH performs a significant amount of bulk
data transfer, network contention may also negatively influence its performance.
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Overall, these figures show that LogGOPSim closely tracks the results measured
with libchkpt. For all the configurations examined, the absolute wall clock time
simulated by LogGOPSim is within 20% of the measured values for CTH and within 5%
of the measured values for LAMMPS. Although the error in LogGOPSim’s predictions
of the execution time of CTH is, in some cases, relatively large, its results closely
mimic the trends exhibited by CTH in the libchkpt results.

4.5.2

Validating Simulation of Failures and Rollback
Avoidance

This subsection validates the simulator when errors may occur during an application’s
execution by examining the results of a sequence of experiments designed to measure
the fidelity of the application execution times predicted by the simulator. It also
considers the impact of using rollback avoidance to recover from errors without rolling
back to an earlier checkpoint. The experiments discussed in this section use a trace
collected from 128 MPI processes running LAMMPS with the SNAP potential. The
trace was collected over 10.12 hours of execution. Using this trace as the baseline,
I used the simulator’s extrapolation feature to repeatedly double the size of the
simulated system. The largest system considered consisted of 128 Ki MPI processes.
Figure 4.4 compares the results of this series of simulations against the execution
times predicted by the model introduced in Chapter 3. This figure considers four
different combinations of values for the probability of rollback avoidance (pa ) and
runtime overhead (oa ). The primary y-axis shows the overall execution time predicted
by our model and simulator. The secondary y-axis shows the percentage difference
between the model and the simulator. Over this set of configurations, the execution
times predicted by the simulator closely track those predicted by the model; in no
case is the difference between the two larger than 6%.
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Figure 4.4: Validation of simulation framework against analytic model for coordinated
checkpointing. This figure compares the execution time predicted by the simulation
framework to the model for coordinated checkpointing introduced in Chapter 3.
Each simulation result represents the mean of 24 independent simulations. These
data are based on the simulation of a 10.12 hour run of LAMMPS with the SNAP
potential. The simulator and the model used identical values for the checkpoint
commit time (δ = 5 minutes) and node MTBF (Θn = 5 years). Both use the optimal
checkpoint interval (τopt ) without considering the impact of rollback avoidance on the
effective MTBF of the system. In all four experiments, the simulation data closely
match the results predicted by the model.

4.6

Simulating the Impact of Rollback Avoidance
on Uncoordinated Checkpoint/Restart

The simulation framework described in this chapter facilitates the evaluation of
the potential benefit of using rollback avoidance in conjunction with uncoordinated
checkpointing. Figure 4.5 examines how increasing the fraction of errors for which
rollback can be avoided impacts application execution time. The results in these figures were collected by simulating 65,536 nodes executing LAMMPS with the SNAP
potential. The original trace was collected on 128 nodes and represents 10.12 hours
of execution. Each simulation result is the arithmetic mean of 24 independent sim-

78

Chapter 4. Simulating Rollback Avoidance and UncoordinatedCheckpoint/Restart
ulations. To understand the relationship between rollback avoidance and system
reliability, experiments were conducted to examine two cases: (i) a moderately unreliable system (Θn = 5 years) in Figures 4.5(a) and 4.6(a); and (ii) a very unreliable
system (Θn = 1 year) in Figures 4.5(b) and 4.6(b). The simulation results are presented from two perspectives. Figures 4.5(a) and 4.5(b) show how much faster the
application is relative to uncoordinated checkpoint/restart when rollback avoidance
is used. Figures 4.6(a) and 4.6(b) show the percentage of the application’s overall
execution time that is consumed by fault tolerance. To help isolate the impact of
the probability of rollback avoidance (pa ), we assume that the overhead is zero (i.e.,
oa = 0.0) in all cases. There is currently no widely-accepted method for calculating
the checkpoint interval for uncoordinated checkpoint/restart. Because one of the
explicit goals of uncoordinated checkpoint/restart is to reduce contention for write
bandwidth to persistent storage, the checkpoint commit time (δ) used in these experiments is 2 seconds. The checkpoint interval (τ) is 2 minutes. To put this value
in perspective, it is equal to the optimal checkpoint interval that would obtain for
the more reliable configuration of this simulated system (i.e., Θn = 5 years) if we
used coordinated checkpoint/restart instead of uncoordinated checkpoint/restart.
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Figure 4.5: Effect of pa on application execution time. Evaluating the impact of
rollback avoidance and uncoordinated checkpointing on application performance relative to uncoordinated checkpointing by itself for two different values of node MTBF
(Θn ). Each simulation result is average of 24 independent simulations. These data
are based on the simulation of a 10.12 hour run of LAMMPS with the SNAP potential. The checkpoint commit time (δ) is 2 seconds, and the checkpoint interval (τ)
is 2 minutes. To isolate the impact of the probability of rollback avoidance, pa , all
of these data assume zero overhead (i.e., oa = 0.0).
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Figure 4.6: Effect of pa on fault tolerance overhead. Evaluating the impact of rollback
avoidance and uncoordinated checkpointing on the overall fault tolerance overhead
for two different values of node MTBF (Θn ). Each simulation result is average of
24 independent simulations. These data are based on the simulation of a 10.12 hour
run of LAMMPS with the SNAP potential. The checkpoint commit time (δ) is 2
seconds, and the checkpoint interval (τ) is 2 minutes. To isolate the impact of the
probability of rollback avoidance, pa , all of these data assume zero overhead (i.e.,
oa = 0.0).
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Figure 4.7: Application speedup as a function of pa and oa . Evaluating the relationship between the probability of rollback avoidance (pa ), the associated overhead
(oa ) and application performance. These results were collected by simulating 65,536
nodes executing LAMMPS with the SNAP potential. This figure examines two different values for the MBTF (Θn ), 1 year and 5 years, of the simulated nodes. The
original trace was collected on 128 nodes and represents 10.12 hours of execution.
Each simulation result is the arithmetic mean of 24 independent simulations. The
checkpoint commit time (δ) is 2 seconds and the checkpoint interval (τ) is 2 minutes.

The data in this figure show that at least for this application (LAMMPS-snap),
the benefits of rollback avoidance are somewhat modest even when the overhead
is assumed to be zero. In all cases, the maximum observed speedup is less than
45%. However, Figures 4.6(b) and 4.6(a) show that the overall overhead of fault
tolerance is small even on very unreliable systems. This is largely due to the relatively
high efficiency of uncoordinated checkpoint/restart when paired with an application
(LAMMPS-snap) that is relatively insensitive to the introduction of CPU detours
(cf. [54]).
The largest system simulated in this section (128 Ki nodes) would have a system
MTBF of approximately 40 minutes (Θn = 5 years) or 8 minutes (Θn = 1 year) if
it used coordinated checkpoint/restart instead. By way of comparison, Chapter 3.6
examined the improvements in application performance that may result from using
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rollback avoidance with coordinated checkpoint/restart. Figure 4.5 shows that the
maximum speedup in application performance is approximately 1.4. In contrast,
Figure 3.9(a) shows that in the case of coordinated checkpoint/restart on systems
with very low MTBFs, rollback avoidance can potentially increase application performance by more than a factor of 6. However, Figure 3.9(b) shows that in the
cases where rollback avoidance achieves this dramatic increase in performance, the
overhead of fault tolerance is very large and likely prohibitive.
The next examination is of how the probability of rollback avoidance (pa ) and the
overhead of avoiding rollback (oa ) interact and impact application execution time.
Figures 4.7(a) and 4.7(b) contain heatmaps showing average speedup of LAMMPSsnap as a function of pa and oa . In these figures, speedup is calculated as the quotient of the average simulated execution time of the base case (pa = 0.0, oa = 0.0)
divided by the average simulated execution time for each pair of values for pa and
oa . In all cases, the average execution time is computed over 24 independent simulations. Figure 4.7(a) shows improvements in application execution time only when
the overhead is very low. Increasing the overhead to 10% eliminates the benefits of
rollback avoidance unless the probability of avoiding rollback exceeds 40%. As the
overhead increases above 10%, rollback avoidance yields no execution time benefit.
Figure 4.7(b) examines the impact on a less reliable system. In this case, more significant performance benefits are possible. However, these gains are possible only as
failures become very prevalent in the system. Chapter 3 showed much larger benefits
(on more reliable systems) when rollback avoidance is combined with coordinated
checkpoint/restart.
The results presented in this section are consistent with existing research on the
noise sensitivity of LAMMPS [54,162,163]. LAMMPS is relatively insensitive to noise
events. As a result, when LAMMPS is combined with uncoordinated checkpointing
its execution time is only modestly degraded. Therefore, the benefits of rollback
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avoidance are also modest.

4.7

Chapter Summary

In this chapter, I presented a new and promising approach to simulating large-scale
systems that use fault-tolerance mechanisms based on the checkpoint/restart model.
We identified a set of platform, application, and resilience characteristics required
for accurate and efficient simulation; described a prototype framework based on extensions to a validated and freely-available application simulator implementing the
LogP model; showed how resilience processing overheads can be effectively modeled as CPU detours; and demonstrated empirically that the simulation approach
described in this chapter accurately predicts the impact of resilience mechanisms.
I also used this simulation framework to evaluate the potential impact of using
rollback avoidance with uncoordinated checkpoint/restart to reduce application execution time. As the data in this chapter show, the benefits of using rollback avoidance
to improve the performance of noise-insensitive applications like LAMMPS-snap are
limited. This result illustrates the potential limits to the benefits of rollback avoidance. However, combining rollback avoidance with uncoordinated checkpointing may
yield greater benefits for applications that are more sensitive to noise.
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Similarity Engine: Exploiting
Application Memory Redundancy
to Improve Resilience

5.1

Introduction

In this chapter, I propose a novel rollback avoidance technique that leverages content
similarity in the memory of HPC applications to improve resilience to uncorrectable
memory errors. For example, when a memory error occurs on a page that is similar
to one or more other pages in the address space of an application, information about
the page’s similarity can be used to reconstruct the contents of the damaged page
without needing to terminate the affected application or restart it from a known
good state (e.g., a checkpoint).
I begin by describing the design and implementation of an HPC-oriented memory similarity service: the Similarity Engine. The Similarity Engine provides a general, application-independent, lightweight service for detecting and tracking per-node

85

Chapter 5. Similarity Engine
memory similarity in HPC applications. I then describe how this service can be leveraged to improve application performance by avoiding rollback when uncorrectable
memory errors occur. I also describe two additional ways in which the service provided by the Similarity Engine can be used to improve application resilience characteristics.

5.2

Implementing the Similarity Engine

The goal of the Similarity Engine is to discover and exploit process-level memory
similarity in HPC applications to improve their resilience and performance. This
section presents the definition of memory similarity and describes the mechanisms
that the Similarity Engine uses to identify and track this similarity.

5.2.1

Overview

The Similarity Engine categorizes all of the pages in an application’s memory into
four categories–zero, duplicate, similar, and unique–defined as follows:
• Zero pages: pages whose contents are entirely zero
• Duplicate pages: pages that (a) are not zero pages; and (b) exactly match the
contents of one or more other pages
• Similar pages: pages that (a) are not duplicate or zero pages; and (b) can
be paired with at least one other page in application memory such that the
difference between the two is smaller than a tunable threshold: the difference
threshold.
• Unique pages: pages that do not fall into any of the preceding three categories
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Application

Description

HPCCG

One of the Mantevo mini-applications [144]. Designed to mimic
finite element generation, assembly and solution for an unstructured
grid problem.

LAMMPS

Large-scale Atomic/Molecular Massively Parallel Simulator
(LAMMPS). A classical molecular dynamics simulator from Sandia National Laboratories [143]. The data presented in this chapter
are from experiments that use the Lennard-Jones (lammps-lj)
and Embedded Atom Model (lammps-eam) potentials that are
included with the LAMMPS distribution.

CTH

A multi-material, large deformation, strong shock wave, solid mechanics code [116] developed at Sandia National Laboratories. The
data presented in this chapter are from experiments that use inputs
that describe the simulation of the detonation of a conical explosive
charge (CTH-st) and the simulation of an explosive detonated near
a steel plate (CTH-blastplate).

LULESH

Livermore Unstructured Lagrangian Explicit Shock Hydrodynamics (LULESH). A proxy application from the Department of Energy
Exascale Co-Design Center for Materials in Extreme Environments
(ExMatEx). LULESH approximates the hydrodynamics equations
discretely by partitioning the spatial problem domain into a collection of volumetric elements defined by a mesh [3, 108].

SAMRAI

Structured Adaptive Mesh Refinement Application Infrastructure
(SAMRAI). A framework from the Center for Applied Scientific
Computing at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory that is designed to enable the application of structured adaptive mesh refinement to large-scale multi-physics problems

Table 5.1: Descriptions of the set of workloads used for evaluating the performance
characteristics of the Similarity Engine.

Although they are categorized separately here, when I discuss similarity in general
in this chapter I mean the set of pages that are duplicate, zero, or similar.
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Based on these definitions, the Similarity Engine works by first tracking application memory allocation and periodically scanning allocated memory. During this
scan, it identifies zero and duplicate pages by computing hashes of page contents,
and uses efficient heuristics to detect similarity. This similarity detection is based on
using a difference algorithm that computes differences between pairs of pages, and
heuristics that choose pairs of pages that are likely to be similar.

5.2.2

Tracking Application Memory

The Similarity Engine tracks an application’s memory allocation by interposing code
between the application and the standard C memory allocation functions (e.g.,
malloc, calloc, free) using features of the GNU linker. Each time the application allocates (or deallocates) memory, the Similarity Engine updates its view of the
memory that is currently allocated by the application.

Managing Memory Modification
Exploiting memory contents requires an accurate picture of which pages have been
modified since they were last categorized. To this end, the Similarity Engine uses
mprotect to make every page of the application’s allocated memory read-only. When
the application writes to a page of read-only memory, a segmentation fault occurs.
The Similarity Engine uses a SIGSEGV signal handler to receive notification of each
segmentation fault. The Similarity Engine’s signal handler updates its metadata to
indicate that the page has been accessed and restores write privileges to the accessed
page.
Periodically, the Similarity Engine needs to re-protect memory pages that the
application has written to. Therefore, the Similarity Engine divides the application’s execution time into tunable protection intervals to track memory accesses. By
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default, each protection interval is 60 seconds long. The Similarity Engine configures a SIGALRM signal to notify it when each interval begins. At the beginning of
each protection interval, the Similarity Engine makes every modified page of memory
read-only and computes the MD5 hash of every page that has been accessed since
the beginning of the preceding interval. We assume that the contents of application
memory are not adversarial. As a result, two pages with same hash value have the
same contents with very high probability. Moreover, if the hash value of a page has
not changed, then the contents of the page have not been modified.

Handling System Calls

The Similarity Engine requires some pages of application memory to be read-only.
However, when read-only memory is passed to the kernel in a system call, writes to
this memory do not invoke Similarity Engine’s user-level segmentation fault handler.
As a result, system calls may fail. If return values are not carefully checked by the
application, the consequences of the failure may be difficult to predict.
To determine the extent to which the applications examined in this chapter may
attempt to pass references to read-only memory to the kernel, I created a version
of the Similarity Engine that leverages Linux’s ptrace mechanism to intercept and
inspect the system calls made by the application. Specifically, this version of the
Similarity Engine creates a child thread during its initialization and uses ptrace
to attach to the application (its parent). Each time the application enters a system
call, the child examines the contents of the registers that contain the arguments being
passed to determine whether they contain a reference to memory that the Similarity
Engine is actively tracking. For the set of applications and associated input decks
considered in this chapter, no references to tracked memory in the arguments to were
found in any system call.
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There are likely applications for which references to user-allocated heap memory
are passed to system calls. In these cases, efficiently identifying similarity without
jeopardizing the correctness of the the simulation will likely require integrating the
Similarity Engine into the kernel.

Passing memory references to MPI

Passing read-only message buffers to the MPI library can result in unpredictable
behavior. The Similarity Engine uses the PMPI profiling layer to intercept MPI
calls that reference one or more message buffers. For each message buffer, the Similarity Engine determines whether the buffer occupies memory that it is tracking
(i.e., whether it is memory that is or may become read-only). If so, the Similarity
Engine makes it writable and updates its metadata to reflect the fact that it is no
longer managing this memory. As a result, the pages that comprise the message
buffers passed to MPI are categorized as unique in all of the statistics presented in
this chapter. The Similarity Engine currently lacks a mechanism for resuming the
tracking of memory used for MPI message buffers.

5.3

Discovering Similarity

The performance of the Similarity Engine depends on how efficiently it is able to
identify pairs of similar pages. This section describes these differencing and pair
identification steps in detail. Because of the importance of heuristics to efficiently
perform these steps, this section evaluates the tradeoffs for the differencing and pair
identification steps.
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5.3.1

Experimental Setup

The remainder of this chapter presents the results of the experiments conducted to
evaluate the potential costs and benefits of exploiting memory content similarity.
The characteristics of seven workloads are considered. These workloads, described
in Table 5.1, include two important DOE production applications (LAMMPS and
CTH), a proxy application (LULESH) from the Department of Energy’s Exascale
Co-Design Center for Materials in Extreme Environments (ExMatEx) [61], a miniapplication from Sandia’s Mantevo suite (HPCCG) and an example application from
an important library used in large-scale DOE production applications (SAMRAI).
For each of LAMMPS and CTH, I consider two different input decks.
For all of the applications except for CTH, the experiments were performed using
Compton, a Linux Infiniband cluster. Because CTH is export-controlled, the CTH
experiments were performed on Chama, also a Linux Infiniband cluster. Details on
the composition and configuration of these clusters are presented in Table 5.2. I
use 4 KiB memory pages throughout. The remainder of this section evaluates the
effectiveness and costs of computing differences and identifying potentially similar
pages. It does so by presenting and examining the results of a series of smallscale experiments. These experiments were conducted by running each of the seven
workloads on 8 MPI processes across 4 nodes of the clusters described above.

5.3.2

Computing Page Differences

At the beginning of each protection interval, the Similarity Engine identifies similarity by computing differences between pairs of pages. This section evaluates the
performance characteristics of four algorithms for computing page differences. These
algorithms include two well-known delta encoding algorithms, a novel lightweight
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Compton

Chama

Nodes

42

1,232

Sockets/Node

2

2

Intel Sandy Bridge
(2.6 GHz / 8 cores)

Intel Sandy Bridge
(2.6 GHz / 8 cores)

Linux 2.6.32

Linux 2.6.32

Mellanox MT26428
QDR InfiniBand HCA

QLogic QLE7340
QDR InfiniBand HCA

OpenMPI 1.8.1

OpenMPI 1.8.4

Processors
Operating System
Interconnect
MPI

Table 5.2: Configuration details of clusters used to gather experimental data.

differencing algorithm, and page compression.1 A description of each of the four
difference algorithms follows:
• bsdiff (and its mirror, bspatch) use suffix sorting and bzip2 to compute differences between pairs of binary files [39].
• Xdelta is an open-source delta encoder/decoder based on VCDIFF [94]. VCDIFF is both an algorithm and a format for encoding the differences between
binary files [101].
• xor+lz4 is a novel lightweight differencing algorithm that combine naive differences (bit-wise exclusive-or) with lightweight compression (lz4). lz4 is a lossless
data compression algorithm that is based on LZ77 compression [2].
• bzip2 is a lossless data compression algorithm that uses Burrows-Wheeler transforms and Huffman coding [1].
1 In

the case of page compression, the compressed page can be viewed as the difference
between the target page and a null page.
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These algorithms compute the difference between a candidate page and a reference
page. This difference would allow the Similarity Engine to recreate the candidate page
from the reference page in the event that the candidate page was corrupted. Because
xor+lz4 generates symmetric differences, the differences it generates to can be used
to reconstruct either the reference page or the candidate page from the other. The
other three algorithms generate asymmetric differences (i.e., the difference between
the candidate page and a reference page can only be used to reconstruct the candidate
page). As a result, xor+lz4 requires the computation of half as many differences.
To efficiently identify similarity in application memory, the Similarity Engine
must be able to quickly encode small differences between pairs of pages. It also must
be able to decode these differences and quickly reconstruct a page from its reference
page. The speed of difference encoding strongly influences the runtime overhead of
the Similarity Engine. The size of the differences will dictate its memory overhead.
To limit the memory overhead, similarity is defined relative to a tunable difference
threshold. A memory page is similar only if the difference between it and a reference
page falls below this threshold.
The suitability of these algorithms for identifying similarity was examined with
two microbenchmarks. To run these microbenchmarks, I constructed a library that
takes periodic snapshots of the allocated memory of each of our target workloads. I
then randomly chose a maximum of 5,000 candidate pages from each snapshot of each
application that were neither zero nor duplicate. For each candidate, I computed the
difference between it and every other page in the same snapshot.
The first microbenchmark measures the speed of difference encoding and decoding. The results are shown in Figure 5.1. The fastest algorithm by a substantial
margin is xor+lz4. It is more than eight times faster than Xdelta and nearly 200
times faster than bsdiff. Moreover, because Xdelta, bzip2 and bsdiff generate asymmetric differences, they must compute twice as many differences as xor+lz4 for the
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same number of pages.
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Figure 5.1: Difference speed microbenchmark. The average time required to compute
the difference between two pages for each of four algorithms. Encode is the average
time to compute the difference between two pages. Decode is the average time to
reconstruct a page. The average is computed over 5,000 random pairs of pages taken
from each of the snapshots taken for each application. This plot includes error bars
showing the standard error. However, the error is too small to be easily seen.

The second microbenchmark measures the size of the differences generated by
each algorithm. For each difference algorithm, the smallest difference computed for
each candidate was recorded. The results are shown in Figure 5.2. In this figure,
a point at (x, y) indicates that for a y fraction of the candidates were considered,
the size of the smallest difference was less than or equal to x bytes.2 As this figure
demonstrates, the speed of xor+lz4 comes with a cost. It generates substantially
fewer small differences than the other three algorithms. As a result, for a fixed
difference threshold, xor+lz4 will tend to identify fewer similar pages.
2 In

principle, the difference between any pair of 4 KiB pages can be captured in 4 KiB
(i.e., as the exclusive-or of the two). However, as this figures shows, none of these algorithms
use this optimization. As a result, some differences produced by these algorithms are larger
than 4 KiB.
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Figure 5.2: Difference size microbenchmark. The distribution of the size of the differences computed by the four difference algorithms considered. These data represent
the result of computing the difference between 5,000 random pairs of pages from each
snapshot of each application.

5.3.3

Finding Potentially Similar Pages

Due to the cost of exhaustively computing differences between the pages in an applications memory, an efficient method for identifying pairs of pages that are likely
to be similar (i.e., pairs of pages for which the difference between them is small) is
necessary. I examined four heuristics for identifying potentially similar pages:
• Neighbor : the pages within the same memory allocation that are immediately
adjacent to the candidate page in the application’s virtual address space;
• Random: two pages chosen randomly from the same memory allocation as the
candidate page;
• Same: all of the pages (except for the neighbors) in the same memory allocation
as the candidate page; and
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• Other : all of the pages that are not in the same memory allocation as the
candidate page.
I used a microbenchmark to determine the relative effectiveness of these approaches. Using the same set of snapshots described above, 5,000 candidate pages
are randomly chosen that were neither duplicate nor zero. For each candidate, the
difference between it and the pages in each of the four categories described above
is computed. Within each of these categories, the size of the smallest observed difference is recorded. The results are presented in Figure 5.3. This figure shows that
there are benefits to considering larger regions of memory. Considering pages within
the same allocation as the candidate page is no worse than considering all of the
application’s other allocations. For all but CTH-st, this means computing fewer
differences.
Table 5.3 shows that Same or Other requires the computation of hundreds or
thousands of differences. Because Neighbor and Random represent the minimum of
just two differences, these approaches are surprisingly effective. Nonetheless, developing more effective and efficient techniques for identifying potentially similar pairs
of pages would increase the benefits of exploiting similarity.
Application
CTH-blastplate
CTH-st
HPCCG
LAMMPS-eam
LAMMPS-lj
LULESH
SAMRAI

Neighbor
2
2
2
2
2
2
2

Random

Same

Other

2 2858
4257
2 36279
639
2 9823 41622
2 3429 136988
2 4382 156924
2
274
7492
2
137 45157

Table 5.3: Difference size microbenchmark. Mean number of differences computed
per application for each of four similarity heuristics: neighbor, random, same and
other.
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Figure 5.3: Similarity heuristic microbenchmark. For each target application a sequence of snapshots of allocated memory were collected. Up to 5,000 candidate pages
are randomly selected from each snapshot of each application. For each candidate,
differences are computed between it and all of the other pages in memory (differences
between pairs of pages that are identical are not computed). The resulting set of differences is binned based on their size. This figure shows the size distribution for each
of four categories of differences. Neighbor is the set of differences that are computed
between two pages that are adjacent in the virtual address space and belong to the
same allocation. Random is the set of differences the candidate page and each of
two pages chosen randomly from the same memory allocation as the candidate page.
Same is all of the pages (except for the neighbors) in the same memory allocation as
the candidate page. Other are the pages that are not in the same memory allocation
as the candidate page.

5.3.4

Analysis

Based on the results of these microbenchmarks, the Similarity Engine is configured
to use the xor+lz4 algorithm for difference computation and to use the neighbor
heuristic for choosing potentially similar pages. Although these choices reduce the
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amount of similarity that the Similarity Engine is able to identify, they significantly
reduce the cost of discovering the similarity found. For the applications examined in
this section, the runtime overhead of other difference algorithms and similarity identification heuristics are much too large for the additional overhead to be amortized
by the benefits of the additional similarity they discover.

5.4

Evaluating Similarity

This section evaluates the amount of similarity that Similarity Engine can discover
and track in HPC applications, and measures the cost of tracking this similarity.
The experiments presented in this section were conducted on the clusters described
in Table 5.2. These experiments used the set of workloads described in Table 5.1. The
input decks for each workload and the resultant application execution characteristics
are described in Table 5.4. I ran each workload, except LULESH, with 128 processes
on 16 nodes of these clusters. Because LULESH requires the number of processes
be a perfect cube, it ran with 125 process. I repeated each experiment ten times.
The data presented in this section required 900 experiments to be conducted in
which the Similarity Engine was linked against one of the workloads. Approximately,
10% (91/900) of these experiments failed to complete. I discarded all of the data
collected during these failed experiments and repeated the experiments.

5.4.1

Memory Overhead

Effectively exploiting similarity requires the Similarity Engine to maintain metadata
about the memory that is currently allocated by the application. As pairs of similar
pages are identified, the Similarity Engine needs to store the encoded difference and
the address of the reference page. There is a tradeoff between the difference threshold
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Original median
runtime (seconds)

Mean allocated
memory (pages)

Input deck

CTH-st

324.53

37096

st.128
stop cycle = 155

CTH-blastplate

429.04

5130

blast-plate.in
1200 × 1200 mesh

HPCCG

362.39

51457

nx=128, ny=64, nz=64
max. number of
iterations = 5000

LAMMPS-lj

492.24

161106

in.lj x=32 y=16 z=16
200 time steps

LAMMPS-eam

598.53

187673

in.eam x=32 y=16 z=16

LULESH

347.18

3167

-s 32

9249

octant 3blk.3d.input
225 × 225 × 225
grid geometry

Application

SAMRAI

440.03

Table 5.4: Description of the execution parameters for the seven target workloads.

and the resulting overhead. Increasing the difference threshold identifies more similar
pages, but results in the retention of more and larger differences.
To examine this tradeoff, I ran each target application with four difference thresholds: 1 KiB, 2 KiB, 3 KiB and 4 KiB. Each experiment also measured the volume of
metadata required to track the application’s memory use. The metadata includes the
data structures necessary to manage all of the application’s memory allocations, the
data structures for managing computed differences, and the corpus of the differences.
The results are shown in Figure 5.4. With the exception of HPCCG, for difference
thresholds that are 3 KiB or smaller, a few hundred bytes of metadata per 4 KiB
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memory page is sufficient.
For workloads like CTH-blastplate and CTH-st, the fraction of similar pages that
the Similarity Engine is able to identify changes relatively little as the difference
threshold increases. For the remaining workloads there are benefits to be reaped
by considering a larger difference threshold. These data suggest that a difference
threshold of 3 KiB represents a good tradeoff between the number of similar pages
and metadata volume.
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Figure 5.4: Difference threshold benchmark. For each target application, this figure
consider the trade off between the number of similar pages and the metadata storage
overhead. As the difference threshold increases, larger differences are allowed and
the metadata overhead increases.
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5.4.2

Runtime Overhead

Identifying similarity using these techniques requires that the Similarity Engine occasionally interrupt the application. It interposes metadata maintenance operations
between the application and the standard C memory allocators. It restores write
privileges as accesses to read-only pages generate segmentation faults. As each protection interval begins, it must also change the access privileges for pages of allocated
memory to be read-only and identify similar pairs of pages. For each of the target
workloads, Table 5.5 shows the inflation of the application’s execution time due to
the Similarity Engine.

Application
CTH-blastplate
CTH-st
HPCCG
LAMMPS-eam
LAMMPS-lj
LULESH
SAMRAI

Runtime
Runtime
Write Allocations
Overhead
Overhead Exceptions
Added
(all similar) (duplicate only) Per Second Per Second
0.60%
2.76%
1.26%
14.60%
13.28%
9.90%
1.84%

4.69%
1.99%
1.30%
11.14%
9.92%
8.89%
1.58%

23.99
485.46
54.31
2471.62
1984.47
31.42
67.64

1.04
0.06
0.06
1.65
1.96
3319.75
594.68

Table 5.5: Median runtime overheads (ratio of median execution times) using
xor+lz4, a 3072-byte difference threshold, and a 60 second protection interval. The
coefficient of variation for the execution time data used to generate this table is
below 1.5% for CTH-st, HPCCG, LAMMPS-eam, LAMMPS-lj, and SAMRAI. The
coefficient of variation for the “all similar” runtime overhead of LULESH is approximately 22%. The coefficients of variation for the other two LULESH experiments is
less than 1%. The coefficients of variation for all of the CTH-blastplate experiments
exceed 20%.

This table shows that the applications with the highest overheads have high
rates of memory allocation or they write frequently to memory that the Similarity
Engine has made read-only. LULESH frequently allocates and deallocates mem-
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ory. Frequent changes to the application’s memory allocation necessitates frequent
metadata modification to maintain an accurate view of memory. Accessing pages
of read-only memory can also increase runtime overhead. In addition to the signal
handling overhead, at the end of each protection interval the Similarity Engine computes and encodes differences for every page that has been written to during the
interval. LAMMPS-lj and LAMMPS-eam have relatively stable memory allocations,
but they write to large numbers of read-only pages. The four workloads (CTH-st,
CTH-blastplate, SAMRAI, and HPCCG) that write to relatively few read-only pages
and have stable memory allocations exhibit the lowest overheads.
This table also considers the incremental cost of identifying similar pages in addition to duplicate and zero pages. The second column of Table 5.5 shows the
overhead if the Similarity Engine only considers duplicate and zero pages. For all of
the workloads save LAMMPS-lj and LAMMPS-eam the additional runtime overhead
of identifying similar pages is quite modest.
Table 5.5 shows that for CTH-blastplate, the results for the “duplicates only” experiments indicate higher overhead than the results of the “all similar” experiments.
These results are counter-intuitive given that the work of tracking duplicate and zero
pages is a subset of the work of tracking similar, duplicate and zero pages. Figure 5.5
shows the execution times measured over twenty trials of the “duplicates only” and
“all similar” experiments. These results are very noisy; even for the unmodified case,
the fastest and slowest execution times differ by hundreds of seconds. As a result,
it is difficult to make fine-grained distinctions between the runtimes of each of these
three cases.
Another factor to consider in the runtime overtime analysis is the extent to which
the Similarity Engine is doing useful work. At the beginning of each protection
interval, the Similarity Engine computes differences between pairs of memory pages.
A useful difference is a difference that is smaller than the difference threshold. On
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Figure 5.5: Raw execution time data for CTH-blastplate. The amount of time required to complete a fixed problem varies significantly across runs. As a result, it
it difficult to make detailed comparisons between these three application configurations: original is the original CTH executable (i.e., not linked against the Similarity
Engine), all similar is CTH linked against a version of Similarity Engine that tracks
similar, duplicate, and zero pages, duplicates only is CTH linked against a version of
Similarity Engine that only tracks duplicate and zero pages.

the other hand, if the difference exceeds the difference threshold, it is discarded and
the time spent computing the difference is wasted. Table 5.6 examines the percentage
of useful differences that are computed as a function of the difference threshold. As
this table shows, few of the differences computed in the memory of LAMMPS-lj,
LAMMPS-eam, and SAMRAI are useful. Given that LAMMPS-lj and LAMMPSeam exhibit the highest runtime overheads of these seven workloads, a lightweight
heuristic for identifying and excluding pairs of pages that are unlikely to be similar
could improve the performance of the Similarity Engine with these workloads.
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Application

Difference Threshold
1 KiB
2 KiB
3 KiB

LAMMPS-lj
3.16% 3.70%
CTH-blastplate 49.67% 57.43%
SAMRAI
14.13% 14.99%
LAMMPS-eam
2.21% 2.59%
HPCCG
43.36% 70.49%
CTH-st
98.01% 99.86%
LULESH
47.35% 61.33%

4 KiB

10.16% 72.32%
76.12% 83.31%
16.56% 32.10%
13.51% 64.21%
72.98% 100.00%
99.92% 99.96%
69.53% 76.79%

Table 5.6: Useful difference rate. For each combination of workload and difference
threshold, this table contains the percentage of computed differences that are useful
differences, i.e., smaller than the associated threshold. Differences that are larger
than the threshold are discarded. The time spent computing differences that are
ultimately discarded is therefore wasted.

5.4.3

Prevalence of Similarity

The ultimate objective is to identify similarities in memory. To evaluate how effectively the Similarity Engine can extract similarity, I configured it with a protection
interval of 60 seconds and a sample interval of 20 seconds. Configured this way,
the Similarity Engine looks for similarity and re-protects memory every 60 seconds.
Every 20 seconds it examines the current state of memory to determine how much
similarity remains since the beginning of the protection interval. Each time the application writes to a similar, duplicate or zero page, its state and its relationship to
other pages in memory are no longer known. Because accessed pages must be classified as unique, the prevalence of similarity necessarily decreases between protection
intervals.
The results of these experiments are shown in Figure 5.6. This figure shows the
mean fraction of the pages in application memory that fall into the four page categories defined in this chapter. For each application, this figure shows the average
fraction of memory in each category for samples taken at the beginning of a pro-

106

Chapter 5. Similarity Engine

Fraction of allocated memory

1

0.8

0.6

0.4

0.2

0
Interval
Begin

Within
Interval

Interval
Begin

LAMMPS-lj

Within
Interval

Interval
Begin

LAMMPS-eam

Within
Interval

Interval
Begin

HPCCG

Within
Interval

LULESH

Fraction of allocated memory

1

0.8

0.6

0.4

0.2

0
Interval
Begin

CTH-st
Duplicate

Within
Interval

Interval
Begin

Zero

Within
Interval

CTH-blastplate
Similar
Unique

Interval
Begin

Within
Interval

SAMRAI

Figure 5.6: Page categorization. A comparison of the average page categorization at
the beginning of a protection interval and the average within a protection interval.
When a page is modified, the Similarity Engine no longer knows its relationship to
other pages in memory. As a result, it must be categorized as a unique page. These
data use xor+lz4 and a difference threshold of 3 KiB.

tection interval. It also shows the average fraction of memory in each category for
samples taken within a protection interval. The mean is computed across all application processes, samples and trials. For each application, there is more similarity
at the beginning of a protection interval than within the interval. The difference is
particularly stark for SAMRAI. On average nearly 75% of memory is similar, duplicate or zero at the beginning of a protection interval; these categories comprise less
than 6% of memory within an interval. The differences are more modest, but still
significant, for the other four applications. For HPCCG and LULESH significant
similarity exists even within a protection interval. More modest similarity is found
in the memory of LAMMPS-lj and LAMMPS-eam, but it may still be possible to
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effectively exploit it.

5.4.4

Variability of Similarity

Figure 5.6 considers the mean fraction of pages in each category. Because the dataset
is multi-dimensional, this subsection also examines how much variability is associated
with each dimension of the dataset. To isolate the variability due to changes in a
single dimension, I computed the mean over the data points that correspond to a
particular value in a given dimension. For example, to evaluate the variability by
process, I computed the mean fraction of pages in each category for all of the samples
collected from the process that was assigned MPI rank 0. To examine the variability
in the page categorization across processes, I computed the mean in this way for
every process.
I measure the variability in the data by computing the coefficient of variation
over each dimension.3 The results are shown in Figure 5.7. First, there is little variability in these data across trials. Additionally, the total number of memory pages
allocation by these workloads is relatively constant across all dimensions. SAMRAI
exhibits signficant variation in the fraction of duplicate, zero, and similar that comprise its memory. This behavior is largely due to the fact that a significant fraction
of SAMRAI’s memory is composed of unique pages. As a result, small changes in the
absolute number of duplicate, similar, and zero pages can result in large variations
in their respective fractions. Similarly, there is a larger variation in unique pages for
CTH-st and LULESH. This is due in part to the fact that the memory allocations
for these applications contain a relatively small fraction of unique pages.
The fraction of memory that is comprised of non-unique (similar, duplicate and
zero) pages is a good proxy for the variability of the potential benefits of exploiting
3 The

coefficient of variation is the standard deviation (σ) divided by the mean (µ).
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memory content similarity. Non-unique pages are those pages that the Similarity
Engine approach is able to exploit. Figure 5.7(e) demonstrates that there is very
little variation in the fraction of non-unique pages in any of the dimensions of the
dataset. The exception is again SAMRAI. There are two principal reasons for this.
Figure 5.6 shows that for SAMRAI the fraction of duplicate pages at the beginning
of a protection interval is much larger than the fraction within a protection interval.
Moreover, because the fraction of non-unique pages in SAMRAI’s memory allocations
is quite small within a protection interval, small changes in the absolute number of
non-unique pages can lead to significant variation in the overall fraction.
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Figure 5.7: Page category variability. An examination of the variability of the composition of each application’s memory using a 3072-byte difference threshold. All is
the value of the coefficient of variation when computed over the entire dataset. By
process represents how much variation exists across application processes. By sample
represents the variation over the lifetime of the application. By trial represents the
variation across successive executions of the application.
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5.5
5.5.1

Exploiting Memory Similarity
Uncorrectable Memory Errors
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Figure 5.8: Modeled application speedup. This figure uses the average fraction of
memory that is duplicate, zero or similar during a protection interval and an existing
model of rollback avoidance [109] to predict application speedup for next-generation
applications whose memory characteristics resemble one of the seven target workloads. This figure was generated using the runtime overhead from Table 5.5 and the
probability of correcting a memory error from Figure 5.6. The system characteristics
are drawn from the hypothetical extreme-scale system described in Table 5.7. The
x-axis corresponds to the reliability of a single DRAM device in FIT, or failures per
billion devices-hours of operation.

Uncorrectable DRAM errors have been shown to be a significant source of failure
on current and future leadership-class HPC systems [155]. When an uncorrectable
ECC error is detected on a modern x86 system, the memory controller raises a
Machine Check Exception (MCE) in the processor. The consequences of raising an
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MCE vary by operating system. Recent versions of Linux attempt to minimize the
impact of an MCE by adopting simple recovery strategies. For example, if the fault
occurred on a page whose contents are backed up by disk (e.g., a clean page in the
page cache), the error can be handled by invalidating the appropriate cache or page
table entry. In the event that none of its recovery strategies is successful, Linux
poisons the hardware page and kills all of the processes that had the faulted page
mapped into their address space [99]. In other operating systems (e.g., the Kitten
lightweight kernel [145], older versions of Linux), an MCE simply crashes the node.
For each duplicate or similar page, the Similarity Engine maintains a description
of its reference page(s) (i.e., the other pages in the system that are either duplicated by or similar to the page under consideration). In the case of similar pages,
it also stores the appropriate encoded difference. When an uncorrectable memory
error occurs on a similar, duplicate or zero page, the metadata maintained by the
Similarity Engine can be used to reconstruct the contents of the damaged page. Reconstructing a duplicate page is straightforward. The contents of the damaged page
are reconstructed from the contents of one of its reference pages.4 For zero pages,
the damaged page can be replaced with a page filled with zeros. For similar pages,
the process is only slightly more complex. The contents of a damaged page can be
reconstructed by applying the difference stored in the Similarity Engine’s metadata
to the associated reference page.
As shown in Figure 5.1, using xor+lz4 to reconstruct a damaged page by decoding
the difference stored in the metadata is extremely fast: on average 3.23µs per 4 KiB
page. The additional memory required for metadata does not significantly increase
the vulnerability of the application to memory errors. An error in the metadata
does not affect the continued operation application. Moreover, if an error occurs in
the set of stored differences (which is the majority of the metadata), the Similarity
4 In

practice, it may be prudent to reconstruct the page in a different physical location
in memory
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Engine can, with high probability, invalidate the difference and regenerate it at the
beginning of the next protection interval. In the worst case, the system can take a
proactive checkpoint (to eliminate lost work that would need to be re-executed) and
restart the application.
parameter

value

nodes
total system memory
memory devices/node
FIT/node (excluding memory)
checkpoint commit time

131,072
32 PiB
1152
1100
10 minutes

Table 5.7: Characteristics of the hypothetical next-generation, extreme-scale system
used to generate Figure 5.8. A FIT value of 1100 corresponds to an MTBF of
approximately 100 years The checkpoint commit time assumes that checkpoints are
written to a parallel file system. Its value is based on existing studies of checkpoint
performance [25, 52, 119].

Exploiting similarity in this way allows the application to continue execution when
an otherwise uncorrectable memory error occurs rather than restarting and rolling
back to the last checkpoint. This increases the mean time to interrupt (MTTI) of
the system. The model of rollback avoidance presented in Chapter 3 can be used
to examine how the increased MTTI would affect the performance of an application executing on a hypothetical next-generation system (see Table 5.7). Based on
the characteristics of this system, the predicted performance of next-generation applications whose memory characteristics are represented by one of the seven target
applications is shown in Figure 5.8. This figure examines the potential benefit of
this approach as a function of memory reliability. Memory reliability is measured
in terms of the failures in time (FIT) per DRAM device: the number of expected
failures per billion hours of device operation. The strawman system is comprised of
nodes whose MTBF is approximately 100 years when memory failures are excluded.
This hypothetical system would have an MTBF of approximately 7 hours. Figure 5.8
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examines a range of potential values for memory reliability, from very reliable (one
or two memory failures in the system per day) to very unreliable (several memory
failures in the system per hour). This range of memory reliability is consistent with
existing projections of memory performance on future systems [50, 112, 155].
As this figure shows, exploiting similarity to correct memory errors is effective
for some but not all memory-use profiles. Applications whose memory-use patterns
resemble those of SAMRAI are unlikely to see much benefit from this approach.
However, applications that use memory like HPCCG and LULESH do can potentially
see substantial increases in application execution speed. If future memory devices
fall on the unreliable end of this range, as some predict for future leadership-class
systems, then applications with memory-use patterns that are similar to LAMMPS-lj
may also see significant gains.

5.5.2

Checkpoint Compression

The Similarity Engine also enables efficient compression of system-level checkpoints
by excluding redundant information. The contents of zero pages can be easily reconstructed when the checkpoint is restored. Similarly, only one copy of every set of
duplicate pages needs to be included in the checkpoint. Appendix B proves that if
the smallest difference is retained for each similar page then the checkpoint needs to
include no more than half of the similar pages. At the end of a checkpoint interval,
the Similarity Engine would execute the same code that is executed at the end of a
protection interval to identify similarity.
Checkpoint compression does not always reduce the checkpoint commit time. The
viability of compressing checkpoints depends on the: (i) compression ratio, (2) compression/decompression speed, and (3) checkpoint commit bandwidth. If the commit
bandwidth is high enough, the benefit of writing a smaller checkpoint is outweighed
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by the time required for compression. The compression ratio and the effective compression speed are computed based on the results presented Section 5.4. Figure 5.9
shows the compression performance metrics for this approach. Figure 5.9(a) shows
the effective compression rate of the technique for each of the seven workloads. For
all of these workloads, the effective compression rate exceeds 80 MiB/s. To put
these results in perspective, I compare against the performance of standard compression algorithms presented by Ibtesham et al. [88]. Due to variations in hardware
resources, workload selection, and workload configuration, a direct comparison may
not be meaningful. However, their results provide context for the results presented in
this section. Ibtesham and his co-authors observed compression rates that were, with
one exception, less than 70 MiB/s. In subsequent experiments, they demonstrated
compression rates above 150 Mib/s for LAMMPS, CTH, and MiniMD [89].
Figure 5.9(b) shows the decompression rate for each of the workloads. These
results show decompression rates in excess of 5 GiB/s. In comparison, Ibtesham et
al. saw decompression rates below 600 MiB/s [88, 89]. While the similarity-based
technique exhibits very high compression and decompression rates, its compression
factors tend to be comparatively modest. In this context, I borrow the compression
factor from Ibtesham et al.: the compression factor is extent to which the size of
the checkpoint is reduced. For example, a compression factor of 10% means that
the compressed checkpoint is 10% smaller than the original. Figure 5.9(c) shows
that the compression factors achieved by this technique are below 70% for all of the
target applications except CTH-st. For the two LAMMPS problems, the compression
factor is less than 10%. In contrast, Ibtesham and his coauthors were able to achieve
compression factors in excess of 70% for all but one of their applications by using
off-the-shelf compression libraries.
Given these individual metrics, I use an existing model to calculate the breakeven commit bandwidth: the maximum aggregate commit bandwidth where using
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compression reduces the checkpoint commit time [88]. If the sustained bandwidth to
persistent storage exceeds this breakeven point, then it is faster to store uncompressed
checkpoints. If the sustained bandwidth is below this breakeven point, then it is faster
to compress before writing them to persistent storage. The mathematical expression
of this model is reproduced in Figure 5.1.

2α × rcomp × rdecomp
= rbreakeven
rcomp + rdecomp

(5.1)

where α is the compression factor, the percentage reduction in checkpoint volume due
to compression, rcomp is compression speed, the rate of data compression, rdecomp is
decompression speed, and rbreakeven is the breakeven point, the value of the sustained
bandwidth to persistent storage at which the speed of compressing checkpoints is
exactly equal to storing uncompressed checkpoints.
The results of using this model are shown in Figure 5.9(d). This figure assumes
a system comprised of 524,288 processes. By comparison, Ibtesham et al. observed
system breakeven bandwidths equivalent to between 25 and 115 TiB/s [88, 89]. For
current systems, aggregate checkpoint commit bandwidths of hundreds petabytes
per second or a few terabytes per second are common. The K computer, the fourth
fastest machine on the November 2014 Top500 list [4], has an aggregate file system
bandwidth of 340 GB/s [141]. Mira, a BlueGene/Q machine at Argonne National
Laboratory and the fifth fastest machine on the November 2014 Top500 list [4], has
has an aggregate file system bandwidth of 240 GB/s [13]. Trinity, a next-generation
machine that is being installed at Los Alamos National Lab is projected to have an
aggregate bandwidth to the parallel file system of 1.45 TB/s [114]. Figure 5.9(d)
shows that until aggregate commit bandwidths approach 10 terabytes per second,
using similarity to compress checkpoints will reduce checkpoint commit time. Using this approach with applications whose memory usage patterns are similar to
LULESH, SAMRAI or HPCCG is likely to yield the largest benefits. As checkpoint
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commit bandwidths increase, the benefits of applications that behave like LAMMPS
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Figure 5.9: Checkpoint compression metrics. The performance characteristics of
using similarity-based compression on system-level checkpoints.

5.5.3

Silent Data Corruption

Similarity in application memory can also be used to detect some errors that would be
otherwise undetected. At the end of each protection interval, the Similarity Engine
knows the set of pages for which there were no write accesses during the protection
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interval. By recomputing the hash value of each of these un-accessed pages, the
Similarity Engine can determine, with high probability, whether the contents of
the page have changed. Similarly, it can also use the set of encoded differences to
determine whether the difference between two pages has changed. If the contents of
a page have changed without a write-access, then some form of silent data corruption
has occurred.

Application
CTH-blastplate
CTH-st
HPCCG
LAMMPS-eam
LAMMPS-lj
LULESH
SAMRAI

Runtime Difference from
Overhead
Baseline
0.81%
1.99%
2.48%
15.89%
14.76%
9.45%
1.82%

+0.20%
-0.75%
+1.20%
+1.12%
+1.31%
-0.41%
-0.02%

Table 5.8: Runtime overheads of silent data corruption detection. These data were
collected using xor+lz4, a 3072-byte difference threshold, and a 60 second protection
interval

The ability to detect some occurrences of SDC reduces the risk of the application
producing an incorrect result. Although it is difficult to quantify the tradeoffs between increased execution time and decreased vulnerability to SDC, I examine the
runtime overhead of exploiting similarity for this purpose in Table 5.8. Comparing
these results to the values in Table 5.5 demonstrates that the additional cost of exploiting similarity to detect SDC is very small. For all of the workloads considered
here, the runtime with the addition of page validation is within 1.5% of the runtime
obtained without this feature enabled. This is due in large part to the fact that
decompressing encoded differences with xor+lz4 is extremely fast (cf. Figure 5.1).

118

Chapter 5. Similarity Engine

5.6

Chapter Summary

This chapter introduced a memory similarity service, Similarity Engine, and demonstrated that it can be used to identify significant similarity in application memory:
95% in CTH-st, 94% in HPCCG, 79% in LULESH, and 70% in CTH-blastplate. The
Similarity Engine is able to extract more modest similarity in the LAMMPS problems, LAMMPS-eam and LAMMPS-lj. However, there are applications for which the
Similarity Engine is unable to identify significant similarity using this approach (e.g.,
SAMRAI). I also showed how the similarity that the Similarity Engine identified can
be used to improve performance by increasing application resilience to memory errors. Specifically, for extreme-scale systems where memory failures are projected to
occur frequently the Similarity Engine can exploit similarity to:

• increase application performance by more than double for HPCCG and CTH-st,
by nearly 80% for LULESH and CTH-blastplate, and by 10% for LAMMPS-lj
and LAMMPS-eam;
• reduce checkpoint commit times by compressing checkpoints; and
• efficiently detect silent data corruption over a significant fraction of memory for LAMMPS-lj, LAMMPS-eam, CTH-st, CTH-blastplate, LULESH, and
HPCCG

The Similarity Engine imposes low overhead due to very efficient methods for identifying pairs of potentially similar pages and for computing differences. The benefits of
this approach could be significantly improved with the development of more efficient
difference algorithms. The algorithm that the Similarity Engine uses, xor+lz4, is
very fast but it identifies much less similarity than the other differencing algorithms.
Similarly, although the simple neighbor heuristic is surprisingly effective, a more
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sophisticated heuristic for identifying pairs of potentially similar pages would also
improve the impact of this technique.
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Chapter 6
Characterizing Memory Content
Similarity in Kernel Memory

6.1

Introduction

The kernel comprises some of the most important software in an HPC system. It mediates access to hardware resources and ensures that processes are properly isolated
from the misbehavior of their peers. A single kernel instance may be responsible for
managing the execution of many application processes running on several physical
cores. Because multiple processes may be dependent on the services provided by
a single instance of the kernel, the consequences of a failure in the kernel are frequently more severe than failures that only affect a single application process. When
a failure occurs in kernel memory, modern kernels will, with a few exceptions, simply
panic [98]. All processes running within the affected operating system are killed as
a consequence.
Currently, most current HPC operating systems provide no memory protection
beyond that provided by the hardware (e.g., error-correcting codes (ECC)). However,
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given the frequency of accesses to kernel memory, there is evidence that errors in these
regions of memory are more common than errors in other regions of memory [87].
Using the technique described in Chapter 5 for exploiting memory content similarities
to protect against memory faults may also be a viable approach for protecting kernel
memory.
In this chapter, I use offline analysis to examine the potential benefits of using
memory content similarity to protect against faults in the kernel memory of two HPC
operating systems. I also examine the costs of detecting similarity and of maintaining
the associated metadata.

6.2

Proposed Approach

In this chapter, I propose to use the memory content similarity techniques described
in Chapter 5 to allow the kernel to recover from uncorrectable DRAM ECC errors
that would otherwise lead to kernel panic and node failure. In this chapter, pages
of kernel memory are divided into the four page categories defined in Chapter 5.2.1:
duplicate, zero, similar and unique. Similar pages are identified by computing differences between pages using the cx_bsdiff [160] differencing algorithm.1 The differences computed by cx_bsdiff are asymmetric. As a result, the relationship between
similar pages may also be asymmetric (i.e., the fact that page A is similar to page B
does not guarantee that the reverse is true). Finally, the difference threshold is set
to 1 KiB.
When an uncorrectable memory fault occurs, knowledge of the similarities within
kernel memory can potentially allow for the fault to be corrected. As discussed
in Chapter 5.5.1, the contents of a similar (or duplicate) page can be used to recon1 cx_bsdiff

is a Python implementation of bsdiff [39].

122

Chapter 6. Characterizing Memory Content Similarity in Kernel Memory
struct the contents of the damaged page.

6.3

Evaluation

To evaluate the viability of this approach, this section considers the memory of two
important HPC operating systems running six HPC workloads. The two operating
systems examined were: (i) Linux 2.6.37 (a full-weight kernel) and; (ii) Kitten (a
lightweight kernel) [145]. Although lightweight kernels have been shown to have superior performance characteristics [137], full-weight kernels dominate today’s largest
machines because of their generality, familiarity, and programmability [5, 50, 125].
The six workloads are briefly described in Table 6.1. They include a production
workload from the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and Marquee Performance
Codes used to evaluate candidate systems in the acquisition of the Sequoia supercomputer at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.

6.3.1

Running Workloads on Kitten

Kitten is a lightweight kernel designed for HPC systems. As such, its underlying
design objective is to provide a familiar Linux-compatible interface where it was
possible to do so without compromising scalability [103]. One of the common Linux
features that is not included in Kitten is a full-featured file system. Instead, it
provides storage in the form of a simple key-value store, where the key is the absolute
path of the file and the value is the contents of the file. Kitten also does not support
the specification of an initial file system image (e.g., initramfs).
Many of the workloads evaluated in this chapter expect to read input data from a
file. As a result, I modified Kitten to create the necessary input files before launching
the application code. Specifically, for each the target workloads, I embedded the
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required input files in the ELF file containing the application’s executable. As part
of its SMARTMAP functionality [30], Kitten includes a loader that launches the
application from an ELF file. I modified this loader to extract the input files from
the ELF file and write their contents to the simple Kitten file system before loading
and executing the application itself.

ASC Sequoia
Marquee
Performance
Codes [107]

DOE
Production
Application

AMG

A parallel algebraic multigrid solver for linear
systems arising from problems on unstructured
grids [78].

IRS

Implicit Radiation Solver.
Solves the radiation transport equation by the flux-limited diffusion approximation using an implicit matrix solution [105].

Large-scale Atomic/Molecular Massively Parallel
LAMMPS Simulator. A classical molecular dynamics simulator [133, 143].

HPCCG

Designed to mimic the finite element generation,
assembly and solution for an unstructured grid
problem.

phdmesh

Parallel Heterogeneous Dynamic Mesh. An application designed to mimic the contact search applications in an explicit finite element application.

SAMRAI

Structured Adaptive Mesh Refinement Application Infrastructure. Designed to enable the application of structured adaptive mesh refinement
to large-scale multi-physics problems [106].

Mantevo MiniApplications
[80, 144]

Miscellaneous
Application

Table 6.1: Summary of HPC applications used to evaluate similarity in the contents
of the kernel memory of Linux and Kitten.
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6.3.2

Identifying Kernel Memory

Memory snapshots of kernel memory were collected and examined offline to evaluate
the prevalence of similarity. To examine the contents of kernel memory, I first needed
to determine which memory was being used by the kernel. I accomplished this goal
by instrumenting the two kernels under consideration to provide information that I
could use to identify regions of active kernel memory.

Linux
Exhaustively tracking all of the pages used by the Linux kernel is not feasible. To
capture as much of the kernel’s memory as possible, I developed a kernel module
that tracks all of the pages that belong to a slab allocator.2 Although this approach
does not capture all of kernel memory (and captures some memory that may not be
in active use), it does capture all of the memory that the Linux kernel allocates with
calls to kmalloc. Moreover, given the overall complexity of memory allocation in
the Linux kernel, this is a relatively straightforward approach for approximating the
similarity characteristics of kernel memory.
In Linux, every page of physical memory is represented by an instance of struct
page. The flags field within each of these structures describes the characteristics of
the associated memory page. In particular, pages managed by a slab allocator have
the PG_slab bit set within the flags field. Based on this structure, I built a kernel
module, meminfo, that allowed for the traversal of physical memory to determine
which pages belonged to a slab cache.
The process of installing and initializing the meminfo module causes a virtual
device, /dev/meminfo, to be created. By using that device as the target of an ioctl
2 Although

the slab allocator has been largely replaced by the more efficient slub allocator [40], the “slab” nomenclature still predominates in the literature.
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command, I can direct the kernel module to write a summary of all of the pages that
currently belong to a slab cache to the system log.
During initialization, the kernel module also registers two kernel probes, a jprobe
and a kretprobe, to track when memory pages are added to or removed from a slab
cache. Kernel probes are provided to allow for debugging the execution of kernel
functions.3 A jprobe allows the user to specify a handler that is called each time
that a specified function is called. A kretprobe allows the user to specify a handler
that is called each time that the kernel returns from a specified function. To track
changes to slab cache membership, I register a jprobe on the return from new_slab
and a kretrpobe on the entry to __free_slab. In each case, when the probe is
triggered, an appropriate message is written to the system log.

Kitten
In the Kitten lightweight kernel, a region of low memory (by default, 64 MB) beginning at address 0 is reserved for kernel use. During the initial boot sequence, a very
simple allocator (bootmem) is used to manage this memory. Near the end of the boot
sequence, management of all unused kernel memory is transferred to a buddy allocator. The buddy allocator handles all of the allocation and deallocation of memory
from the kernel memory region, with the exception of those pages allocated by the
bootmem allocator during the boot sequence. The Kitten buddy allocator, like most
buddy allocators, manages memory in blocks that are a power of two in size. The
minimum block size is 32 bytes.
To determine which blocks of kernel memory have been allocated by the buddy
allocator, I modified the buddy allocator source to track the blocks of memory that
it allocates. Although this approach fails to capture the memory allocated by the
3 Detailed

information
about
kernel
probes
is
contained
Documentation/kprobes.txt file included with the Linux kernel source.
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bootmem allocator, it does allow all of the memory allocated after the kernel memory
subsystem has been initialized to be identified. I also created a new system call,
get_meminfo. When this new system call is invoked, it writes a list of all of the
memory blocks that were ever allocated by the buddy allocator to standard out. I
modified each of the target workloads to invoke this new system call at the beginning
and end of their execution.

6.3.3

Experimental Methodology

To minimize the perturbation of our experimental framework on the operation of
the kernel, I used the checkpointing functionality of the Palacios Virtual Machine
Monitor (VMM) [103] to collect snapshots of the memory of a virtual machine running each of the six workloads on both of our operating systems. I created two
guest machines: one that runs Linux 2.6.37 and another that runs Kitten 1.3.0. For
simplicity, all of our applications were run using a single MPI process.
The checkpointing facility of Palacios allowed me to periodically capture snapshots of the guest machine’s memory (once every 60 seconds for the data presented
in this chapter). As described above, these two operating systems write information
about kernel memory usage to standard out (Kitten) or to the system log (Linux).
The metadata provided by the modified kernels describes page frames in the guest
machine’s memory that are part of kernel memory. Combining this metadata with
snapshots of the guest machine’s memory allows the contents of kernel memory to
be examined.
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6.3.4

Data Analysis

I analyzed each of the collected kernel memory snapshots offline. For each snapshot, I
walked through the address space from low addresses to high, categorizing each page
of memory into one of the four categories described earlier: (a) duplicate; (b) similar;
(c) zero; or (d) unique. As described in Chapter 5, duplicate pages are identified by
computing the MD5 sum of each page. I assume that two pages with the same hash
are duplicate.
For this offline inquiry, I use a different approach for identifying similar pages
than what was used in Chapter 5. The approach used in this section was inspired
by the Difference Engine [76]. Instead of computing patches between every pair of
pages, I attempt to identify a tractably small set of pages for each candidate page
that are likely to be similar to it.
For each page, I collect four 128-byte blocks of memory. These blocks are treated
as a signature of the page contents. These signatures are evenly distributed within
each 4 KiB page of memory (i.e., at offsets of 0, 1024, 2048 and 3072 bytes).
As each candidate page in the address space of an application is examined, pages
that match one or more of the candidate page’s signatures are identified. In the event
that more than one page matches a single signature, I choose the page nearest to the
candidate page. This approach identifies up to four pages that may be similar to the
current candidate page. In addition to these pages, I also consider the page of kernel
memory that occupies the next smallest page frame number. In all, this approach
identifies as many as five pages that are likely to be similar to the candidate page.
I then compute a patch between the current candidate page and each member of
the set of likely similar pages. If any patch is smaller than a threshold, in this case
1024 bytes, the current candidate page is marked as similar. Because cx_bsdiff
does not generate symmetric patches, observing a single patch that falls below the
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threshold is sufficient to categorize only a single page as similar. Therefore, I also
compute the reciprocal patch of each of the pages in the set of likely similar pages
to determine whether any of them should also be marked as similar.
This is a heuristic approach (cf. [76]) based on the idea that the contents of a page
of memory can be meaningfully summarized as a set of signatures. Although there
may be methods that would yield greater numbers of similar pages by generating
smaller differences, the fraction of similar pages identified by this approach is a lower
bound on the total number of similar pages in kernel memory.

6.4

Similarity in Kernel Memory

This section examines the potential costs and benefits of exploiting similarity in
kernel memory. Although the case for resilient operating systems is still emerging
[55], these results suggest that the proposed approach has promise.

6.4.1

Similarity Overview

Figures 6.1(a) and 6.1(b) show the composition of kernel memory for Linux (a heavyweight OS) and Kitten (a lightweight OS). The data for each operating system represent the mean fraction of the kernel memory pages in each of four categories.
Tables 6.2(a) and 6.2(b) provide detailed statistics about the number of pages in
each category. These data were collected over ten trials of each combination of two
operating systems and six workloads. For Kitten, all of the pages of kernel memory
whose contents are ever managed by the buddy allocator are considered. For Linux,
all of the kernel memory that managed by a slab allocator at any point during the
application’s execution are considered.
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Figures 6.1(b) and 6.1(a) show that both Linux and Kitten have a very large
number of similar pages. Also, the kernel memory of both operating systems contains very few duplicate pages. This result is consistent with how the OS uses this
memory; the majority of the state maintained by these OSs is comprised of tablebased structures containing objects such as page table mappings. Given the nature
of page tables, I would expect to find large numbers of similar pages in memory allocated for page table data structures. For x86 processors, each element in the page
table hierarchy occupies a full 4 KiB page of memory even if only a handful of pages
are mapped in the referenced region of virtual memory. As a result, page table data
structures tend to be very sparse: they contain large numbers of null entries. The
presence of few non-null entries in these structures allows the differences between
pages containing them to be compactly represented.
To empirically validate these observations, I instrumented Kitten’s buddy allocator to track the percentage of buddy-allocated memory that is used to store page
table data structures. For each of the six applications considered in this chapter, the
minimum observed percentage of memory that is allocated by the buddy allocator
for page tables is shown in Table 6.2. These data show that page table data structures occupy the vast majority of buddy-allocated memory and thus must also be a
significant source of the similarity observed in Figure 6.1(b).
The page categorization for kernel memory in Linux exhibits much less variation
than kernel memory in Kitten. As shown in Table 6.2(a), there is little variation between trials or across applications in the page categorization of Linux kernel memory.
In contrast, larger variations are visible in the composition of Kitten kernel memory
both between trials and across applications. While both kernels exhibit significant
similarity, it is likely that both the costs and the benefits in Kitten will exhibit larger
variation than in Linux.
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Figure 6.1: Mean page categorization of kernel memory. This figure shows the mean
page categorization of kernel memory for each operating system using a 1024 byte
patch threshold. Each bar represents the mean fraction of memory pages in each of
the four page categories observed over a sequence of 10 trials. As discussed in Section 6.3.2, memory snapshots were collected every 60 seconds of application execution
time, for a total of 5-6 snapshots per workload.
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Page
Category
duplicate
LAMMPS-lj
zero
similar
unique
total
duplicate
IRS
zero
similar
unique
total
duplicate
SAMRAI
zero
similar
unique
total
duplicate
AMG
zero
similar
unique
total
duplicate
phdmesh
zero
similar
unique
total
duplicate
HPCCG
zero
similar
unique
total
Application

Mean (x)
26.60
13.10
2706.50
333.10
3079.30
20.68
13.57
2695.30
338.75
3068.30
23.60
14.18
2698.93
333.38
3070.10
23.20
13.58
2690.13
342.38
3069.30
20.30
13.85
2696.27
336.78
3067.20
19.70
14.00
2700.02
326.18
3059.90

Standard
Deviation (s)
2.75
0.30
12.18
11.39
3.61
3.63
1.03
16.31
16.24
3.25
3.16
1.40
18.05
18.02
4.41
3.09
1.01
20.97
22.24
2.55
2.26
1.16
16.94
17.79
3.28
3.77
1.10
16.40
14.38
1.65

(a) Linux
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99% Confidence
Interval
(25.65 - 27.55)
(13.00 - 13.20)
(2702.32 - 2710.68)
(329.19 - 337.01)
(3078.06 - 3080.54)
(19.44 - 21.93)
(13.21 - 13.92)
(2689.69 - 2700.91)
(333.17 - 344.33)
(3067.18 - 3069.42)
(22.51 - 24.69)
(13.70 - 14.66)
(2692.73 - 2705.14)
(327.19 - 339.58)
(3068.59 - 3071.61)
(22.14 - 24.26)
(13.24 - 13.93)
(2682.93 - 2697.34)
(334.74 - 350.02)
(3068.42 - 3070.18)
(19.52 - 21.08)
(13.45 - 14.25)
(2690.45 - 2702.09)
(330.67 - 342.90)
(3066.07 - 3068.33)
(18.40 - 21.00)
(13.62 - 14.38)
(2694.38 - 2705.65)
(321.24 - 331.12)
(3059.33 - 3060.47)
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Page
Category
duplicate
LAMMPS-lj
zero
similar
unique
total
duplicate
IRS
zero
similar
unique
total
duplicate
SAMRAI
zero
similar
unique
total
duplicate
AMG
zero
similar
unique
total
duplicate
phdmesh
zero
similar
unique
total
duplicate
HPCCG
zero
similar
unique
total
Application

Mean (x)
0.00
63.45
908.50
38.05
1010.00
6.17
127.13
929.35
9.35
1072.00
0.00
56.82
963.25
5.93
1026.00
5.87
37.90
927.67
2.57
974.00
3.83
37.88
926.53
6.75
975.00
5.52
8.55
924.18
2.75
941.00

Standard
99% Confidence
Deviation (s)
Interval
0.00
(0.00 - 0.00)
6.81
(61.11 - 65.79)
145.64
(858.45 - 958.55)
152.45
(0.00 - 90.44)
0.00
(1010.00 - 1010.00)
33.41
(0.00 - 17.65)
26.34
(118.08 - 136.18)
97.99
(895.68 - 963.02)
39.08
(0.00 - 22.78)
0.00
(1072.00 - 1072.00)
0.00
(0.00 - 0.00)
1.98
(56.14 - 57.50)
1.75
(962.65 - 963.85)
0.36
(5.81 - 6.06)
0.00
(1026.00 - 1026.00)
45.44
(0.00 - 21.48)
45.70
(22.20 - 53.60)
98.69
(893.76 - 961.58)
7.56
(0.00 - 5.16)
0.00
(974.00 - 974.00)
29.69
(0.00 - 14.04)
30.08
(27.55 - 48.22)
96.57
(893.35 - 959.72)
36.79
(0.00 - 19.39)
0.00
(975.00 - 975.00)
42.73
(0.00 - 20.20)
42.99
(0.00 - 23.32)
98.36
(890.38 - 957.98)
12.64
(0.00 - 7.09)
0.00
(941.00 - 941.00)

(b) Kitten

Figure 6.2: Detailed page categorization statistics. For each combination of six workloads and two operating systems, this table provides statistics on the number of
similar, duplicate, zero and unique pages observed in kernel memory. These statistics were generated from data collected over ten trials of each application/operating
system pair.
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Application
AMG2006
IRS
LAMMPS-lj
SAMRAI
HPCCG
phdmesh

Minimum Percentage of Buddy-Allocated
Memory Used for Page Tables
93.7%
85.3%
90.8%
90.9%
97.0%
93.7%

Table 6.2: Fraction of Kitten kernel memory used to store page tables. This table
shows the minimum percentage of memory allocated by Kitten’s buddy allocator that
is used for page table data structures over the ten trials of each of six workloads.

Patch Size Threshold
Figure 6.3 facilitates an examination of the tradeoff between the size of the difference
and memory overhead in these operating systems. It shows the fraction of similar and
duplicate pages as a function of metadata size. The data in this figure were collected
over ten trials of each combination of the two kernels and six applications considered
in this chapter. For each application, this figure shows a very narrow shaded a region
that contains all of the observations collected over the series of trials. Consistent with
observations in the preceding section, there is more variation across applications in
the Kitten data. However, taken as a whole, the tradeoff between memory to store
differences and the number of similar pages is consistent from trial to trial and largely
independent of the application.
The slope of these curves represents the ratio of cost to benefit. For Kitten,
increasing the difference threshold results in a dramatic increase in the fraction of
similar pages yet it requires only a very small increase in the size of the metadata.
For Linux, increasing the patch size comes at a greater (but still modest) cost. For
both OSs, only a modest amount of metadata (less than 12%) is required to protect
all of kernel memory using the proposed approach.
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100%
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Figure 6.3: Non-unique memory pages as a function of metadata volume. This
figures shows the fraction of non-unique (i.e., duplicate, zero and similar) pages as
a function of metadata size for Kitten and Linux running six workloads. Ten trials
were conducted for each application and six memory snapshots were collected during
each run. Due to variations in the timing of the first snapshot, only the results
from the last five snapshots for each trial are included here. The shaded region for
each application shows the range of observed results. For Linux, there is very little
variation between applications and the last sequence rendered is the only one that
is visible.

Modification Behavior

The cost of maintaining the metadata necessary to correct memory errors will depend, in part, on the rate at which similar and duplicate pages are modified. To
examine the frequency of kernel memory modification, Table 6.3 compares the contents of kernel memory pages across the sequence of collected snapshots. The data in
this table are aggregated over the series of trials that were performed. As these data
show, a significant majority of similar and duplicate pages are not modified during
the application’s execution. These results are consistent with how these operating
systems use memory; they construct tables that are written once and read many
times. The infrequent modification of similar and duplicate pages in kernel memory
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Application
AMG2006
IRS
LAMMPS-lj
SAMRAI
HPCCG
phdmesh

Similar/Duplicate
Pages
27211
27252
27395
27288
27288
27257

Changed
1+ Times
351 (1.29%)
411 (1.51%)
359 (1.31%)
488 (1.79%)
415 (1.52%)
441 (1.62%)

Changed
1 Time
240 (0.88%)
196 (0.72%)
259 (0.95%)
274 (1.00%)
233 (0.85%)
253 (0.93%)

Changed
Changed
Changed
2 Times
3 Times
4+ Times
10 (0.04%) 6 (0.02%) 95 (0.35%)
11 (0.04%) 0 (0.00%) 204 (0.75%)
28 (0.10%) 0 (0.00%) 72 (0.26%)
19 (0.07%) 10 (0.04%) 185 (0.68%)
17 (0.06%) 1 (0.00%) 164 (0.60%)
15 (0.06%) 0 (0.00%) 173 (0.63%)

(a) Linux
Application
AMG2006
IRS
LAMMPS-lj
SAMRAI
HPCCG
phdmesh

Similar/Duplicate
Changed
Pages
1+ Times
9730
20 (0.21%)
10688
138 (1.29%)
10072
29 (0.29%)
10204
152 (1.49%)
9401
10 (0.11%)
9731
1 (0.01%)

Changed
Changed
Changed
1 Time
2 Times
3 Times
10 (0.10%) 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%)
96 (0.90%) 4 (0.04%) 0 (0.00%)
20 (0.20%) 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%)
81 (0.79%) 27 (0.26%) 32 (0.31%)
0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%)
0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%)

Changed
4+ Times
10 (0.10%)
38 (0.36%)
9 (0.09%)
12 (0.12%)
10 (0.11%)
1 (0.01%)

(b) Kitten

Table 6.3: Modification behavior of similar and duplicate kernel memory pages.
This table shows the frequency with which pages in kernel memory that are ever
categorized as similar or duplicate. Ten trials were conducted for each application/operating system pair. Six memory snapshots were collected during each run.
Due to variations in the timing of the first snapshot, only the results from the last five
snapshots for each trial are included here. For each application, these data represent
the total number of pages captured over all ten trials. These results demonstrate
that similar and duplicate pages in kernel memory change very little over the lifetime
of an application.

suggests that the cost of metadata maintenance will be low.

6.5

Chapter Summary

This chapter examined the feasibility of exploiting memory content similarity in kernel memory. The results in this chapter point to the potential of this novel technique
to efficiently protect against uncorrectable memory errors in kernel memory. For
both Linux and Kitten, significant similarity exists in regions of kernel memory. Additionally, similar and duplicate pages in kernel memory are infrequently modified
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and can be protected with small volumes of metadata.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion and Future Work

The objective of the work presented in this dissertation was to demonstrate that rollback avoidance techniques can be used effectively to mitigate the performance impact
of failures on next-generation extreme-scale systems. In this chapter, I summarize
my contributions and explore potential next steps.

7.1

Summary

In this dissertation, I examined the benefits and costs of using rollback avoidance to
augment checkpoint/restart-based fault tolerance mechanisms. Using a combination
of numerical models, simulation, and implementation, I demonstrated that rollback
avoidance techniques have the potential to address the deleterious performance impact of the increase in failure frequency that is projected for next-generation systems.
We discuss each of the major contributions of the work presented in this dissertation
below.
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1. An Analytic Model of Rollback Avoidance and Coordinated
Checkpoint/Restart
In Chapter 3, I developed and validated an analytic model of the impact of
rollback avoidance on application performance. I used this model to demonstrate that when coordinated checkpoint/restart is used on systems that experience frequent failure, rollback avoidance can yield significant performance
benefits. I also showed that checkpoint/restart will likely still be an important
part of fault tolerance; it is unlikely that rollback avoidance by itself will be
sufficient on next-generation systems. This model also allowed us to demonstrate that exploiting memory content similarity as described in Chapter 5 has
the potential to yield significant improvements in application performance on
next-generation systems.
2. Simulation of Rollback Avoidance and Coordinated
Checkpoint/Restart
In Chapter 4, I presented and validated a simulation framework for simulating
the performance impact of fault tolerance activities on next-generation systems. Using this framework, I showed the limitations of rollback avoidance.
For some applications, namely those that are insensitive to noise and noiselike interruptions, I demonstrated that rollback avoidance may only modestly
improve application performance when asynchronous checkpoint/restart and
message logging are employed.
3. Exploiting Memory Content Similarity to Protect Against Faults in
Application Memory
In Chapter 5, I presented and evaluated a software library for extracting memory content similarity: the Similarity Engine. Using this library, I characterized
the prevalence of similarities in application memory for several important applications, proxies, and mini-applications. We then examined and evaluated three
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techniques for exploiting this information to reduce the performance impact of
rollbacks caused by faults in application memory.
4. Examining the Viability of Using Memory Content Similarity to
Protect Against Faults in Kernel Memory
Finally, in Chapter 6, I examined the feasibility of using my memory content
similarity technique to protect kernel memory against memory faults. I demonstrated that in Linux and Kitten kernel memory contains significant similarity.
Moreover, I showed that the overhead of this approach is likely to be modest
because kernel memory changes infrequently and it can be protected by a small
volume of metadata.

7.2

Future Work

In this dissertation, I have thoroughly examined the potential costs and benefits of
using rollback avoidance on next-generation systems. However, a number potential
research inquiries remain.
My model of rollback avoidance in Chapter 3 is an extension of Daly’s model of
application execution. As a result, it is limited to modeling exponentially-distributed
failures and coordinated checkpoint/restart. While overcoming these limitations
pose significant challenges, extending the model to account for other failure distributions and to account for the performance impact of uncoordinated checkpoint/restart
would increase the power of this model.
The simulation framework introduced in Chapter 4 is a powerful tool. However,
like my model, it also only supports exponentially distributed failures. Extending it
to simulate other failure distributions would allow us to examine the impact of the
failures distribution on rollback avoidance. From a software engineering perspective,
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there are a number of enhancements that would increase the power of the simulator as a research tool. These include parallelization and adding support for MPI
subcommunicators. These features would allow us to simulate a wider variety of
applications running on larger systems.
In Chapter 5, I demonstrated that the memory of several applications contain
significant similarity. Understanding how similarity arises in application memory
might allow us to structure the application in a way that increases this similarity.
One of the biggest costs of my approach is the cost of computing differences. In
Chapter 5.3.3, I demonstrated that the neighbor heuristic is efficient and reasonably
effective. However, for a given difference threshold, it identifies only a fraction of the
total similar pages. Identifying more effective methods for identifying pairs of likely
similar pages would improve the overall impact of our approach.
Finally, in Chapter 6 I examined the feasibility of exploiting content similarity
in pages of kernel memory. The next step is to implement a runtime system in the
kernel that can identify and exploit similarities.
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Appendix A
Derivation of Rollback Avoidance
Models

A.1

Modeling the Probability of Rollback Avoidance

This section examines expected time between errors that result in the application
rolling back to an earlier checkpoint. Xi is an indicator random variable to indicate
when rollback due to an error is avoided.

Xi =



1 if i or more consecutive failures can be avoided

0 otherwise
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Using Xi , the interarrival time of unavoidable rollbacks can be captured in the following way.

Yi = the interarrival time of the ith failure
p = probability of avoiding an error
Y = the interarrival time of the next unavoidable rollback

Therefore:

Y =

∞
X

Xi Yi

i=0

E(Y ) =
=

∞
X
i=0
∞
X

E(Xi Yi )
E(Xi )E(Yi )

i=0

=M

∞
X

E(Xi )

i=0

=M

∞
X

pi

i=0

=

M
1−p

Because rollback avoidance and interarrival times are independent in this model, the
expectation of the product is equal to the product of the expectation. Finally, the
expected value of Y (i.e., E(Y )) is the effective MTBF after the effect of rollback
avoidance is accounted for. Further, because the interarrival times of errors are
exponentially distributed and the number of consecutive errors for which rollback is
avoided rollback is geometrically distributed, the resulting times between unavoidable
rollbacks are also exponentially distributed [156, p. 320].
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A.2

Modeling Rollback Avoidance + Coordinated
Checkpoint/Restart

A.2.1

Showing the Limit with Optimal Checkpoint Interval

When pa = 1.0 this model is undefined. However, this subsection shows that the
model converges to the correct result as pa → 1.0. The limit of Tw (pa , oa ) depends on
how the checkpointing interval is determined. The analysis in this section considers
two cases: (i) Daly’s optimal checkpoint interval [42], and (ii) a fixed interval. The
limits are different in these two cases because the optimal checkpoint interval depends
on pa ; as pa increases so does the optimal checkpoint interval. The analysis begins
by considering the optimal checkpoint interval. In this case, the result is that:
lim Tw (pa , oa ) = Ts0

(A.1)

pa →1.0

In other words, if all rollbacks could be avoided the total work time would be equal
to the application’s solve time, including the overhead of avoiding rollbacks. Considering the impact of rollback avoidance, the value of the optimal checkpoint interval
(τ0opt ) when δ < 2M is:
s
τ0opt =

"
!1/2
!#
2δM
1 δ(1 − pa )
1 δ(1 − pa )
1+
+
−δ
(1 − pa )
3
2M
9
2M

(A.2)

Daly also provides an optimal checkpoint interval for the case where δ ≥ 2M . However, as pa → 1.0, the system MTBF effectively becomes infinite. As a result, for any
finite value of δ, the optimal checkpoint interval will be defined by Equation A.2 when
pa is close to 1.0. Tw can be expressed in terms of pa by combining Equations 3.1
and 3.3.
Tw (pa ) =

!
 0
 T0
M
eR(1−pa )/M e(τopt +δ)(1−pa )/M − 1 0 s
1 − pa
τopt
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To allow for a more compact representation let:
0

τ̂ = τopt (1 − pa )/M
s
"
!1/2
!#
!
1 − pa
2δM
1 δ(1 − pa )
1 δ(1 − pa )
=
1+
−δ
+
M
1 − pa
3
2M
9
2M
√
p
δ(1 − pa )3/2 −3/2
2δ(1
−
p
)
δ
a
= 2δ(1 − pa )M −1/2 −
M −1 +
M
3
9
The result is:
 T0
M R(1−pa )/M  (τ0opt +δ)(1−pa )/M
e
− 1 0s
e
1 − pa
τopt
0

T
= eR(1−pa )/M eτ̂+δ(1−pa )/M − 1 s
τ̂
 0
τ̂+δ(1−pa )/M
e
− 1 Ts
=
−R(1−p
)/M
a
τ̂e

Tw (pa ) =

Take the limit of Tw as pa approaches 1.0.
 0
eτ̂+δ(1−pa )/M − 1 Ts
lim Tw (pa ) = lim Tw (pa )
p→1.0
p→1.0
τ̂e−R(1−pa )/M
0

To simplify the algebra, let M = M/(1 − pa ).
0

lim Tw (pa ) = lim
Tw (M )
0

p→1.0

M →∞

= lim
0

 0
0
eτ̂+δ/M − 1 Ts
τ̂e−R/M

M →∞

0

Because the limit of the numerator and the denominator are both zero, L’Hôpital’s
Rule can be applied. This yields:
0

lim Tw (pa ) = lim
0

M 0 →∞

M →∞

Ts eτ̂+δ/M

0

dτ̂
dM 0

R −R/M 0
τ̂
2e
M0
0

= lim
0

M →∞

+

Ts eτ̂+(δ+R)/M
R
2 τ̂
M0

δ
2
M0
0 dτ̂
e−R/M dM 0

0

dτ̂
dM 0
dτ̂
+ dM
0

where:



−

−

δ
2
M0



√
√
dτ̂
2δ 0 −3/2
2δ 0 −2
δ δ 0 −5/2
=−
M
+
M
−
M
dM 0
2
3
6

146

(A.3)

Appendix A. Derivation of Rollback Avoidance Models
In Equation A.3, the limit of both the numerator and denominator are zero. However,
a factor of M

0 3/2

can be eliminated from each. This yields:

lim Tw (pa ) =

M 0 →∞

=
=
=

√

√
0 −3/2
0 −2
0 −5/2 
2δ
δ
δ δ
M
−
M
−
M
2
3
6
√
√
lim

0 −3/2
0 −2
0 −5/2
2δ
δ δ
R
2δ
M 0 →∞
M
−
M
−
M
−
2 τ̂ +
0
2
3
6
M
√
√
0 −1/2
0 −1 
0 (τ̂+(δ+R)/M 0 )
δ
δ δ
2δ
− 6 M
Ts e
− 2 − 3M
√
√
lim

0 −1/2
δ δ
M 0 →∞ RM 0 −1/2 τ̂ + − 2δ + 2δ M
−
M 0 −1
2
3
6
√
√ 
0
Ts e(0+0) − 22δ − 3δ 0 − δ 6 δ 0
√
√ 
R · 0 · 0 + − 22δ + 2δ3 0 − δ 6 δ 0
√ 
0
Ts − 22δ
√
− 22δ
0

Ts e(τ̂+(δ+R)/M

0

)

−

0

= Ts
As the probability of avoiding rollback approaches 1.0, the cost of checkpointing
and failure recovery approach zero. As a result, the total work time converges to
0

the application’s native time-to-solution (Ts ) expanded by the overhead of avoiding
rollback (1 + oa ).

A.2.2

Showing the Limit with Fixed Checkpoint Interval

In this case, the result is that:
lim Tw (pa , oa ) = Ts0

(A.4)

pa →1.0

lim Tw (pa ) = lim

pa →1.0

pa →1.0

!

T 0
M
R(1−pa )/M
(τ+δ)(1−pa )/M
e
e
−1 s
1 − pa
τ
0

To simplify the algebra, let M = M/(1 − pa ).

T 0
0
0 R/M 0
(τ+δ)/M
lim Tw (pa ) = lim
Me
e
−1 s
0
pa →1.0
τ
M →∞
0

0

Ts
e(τ+δ)/M − 1
=
lim
0
τ M 0 →∞ 1 0 e−R/M
M
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Because the limit of the numerator and the denominator are both zero L’Hôpital’s
Rule can be applied.
0

T
lim Tw (pa ) = s lim
pa →1.0
τ M 0 →∞ −

(τ+δ)/M
− (τ+δ)
02 e

M
0
1
−R/M
2e
M0

+

0

R R/M 0
3e
M0
0

0

−(τ + δ)e(τ+δ)/M
T
= s lim
0
0
τ M 0 →∞ −e−R/M + R0 eR/M
M
0

T −(τ + δ)
= s
τ −1 + 0

δ
0
= Ts 1 +
τ

A.3

Modeling Rollback Avoidance Without
Checkpoint/Restart

A.3.1

Extending Daly’s Model

Daly began with a high-level model of the time required to execute an application
[42]. In this model, he expresses the total execution time, Tw , as:
Tw (τ) = solve time + dump time + rework time + restart time
Because no checkpoints are taken in the case of model rollback avoidance without
checkpointing, two changes to this high-level model are required: (i) set the dump
time to zero; and (ii) express Tw as a function of pa and oa . This yields:
Tw (pa , oa ) = solve time + rework time + restart time
0

Given this high-level model, the solve time is Ts : the native solve time of the application plus the overhead of avoiding rollback. Daly states that the cost of restarting
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and redoing lost work can be expressed as:


rework time + restart time = E(∆t) + R)P (∆t)n(∆t) +


E(∆t + R)(1 − P (∆t))n(∆t)
where:
E(∆t) = the expected point of failure in an interval of size ∆t
=M+

∆t
1 − e∆/M

P (∆t) = the probability of completing an interval of size ∆t
without interrupt
= e−∆t/M
n(∆) = the expected number of interrupts in an interval of size ∆t
= Tw (pa , oa )/M
When rollback occurs without checkpointing, the application must start over from
the beginning. As a result, the application will complete its execution only when an
interval of size Ts completes without requiring rollback. This yields:
Tw (pa , oa ) = solve time + rework time + restart time

0 
0
0
0
= Ts + (E(Ts ) + R)P (Ts )n(Ts ) +

0 
0
0
E(Ts + R)(1 − P (Ts ))n(Ts )
0

=
=

−(E(Ts0 ) + R)P (Ts0 ) −
0

0

Ts +R

0
0
1−e(Ts +R)/M
0

0

M Ts e(Ts +R)/M

=
−

0

Ts0

0
0
1−eTs /M
0

=

0

M Ts
0
0
M − (E(Ts ) + R)P (Ts0 ) − E(Ts0 + R)(1 − P (Ts0 ))
0
0
M Ts

−R−
0

0

M Ts e(Ts +R)/M
−

Ts0

0
0
1−eTs /M
0

0

0

− R + Ts0 + R
0

0

(Ts0 +R)e(Ts +R)/M
0
0
1−e(Ts +R)/M

0

= M eR/M (eTs /M − 1)
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0

+
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0

1−e(Ts +R)/M
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A.3.2

Showing the Limit

When pa = 1.0 this model is undefined. However, this subsection shows that the
model produces the converges to the correct result as pa → 1.0. In particular, it
shows that:
0

lim Tw (pa ) = Ts

pa →1.0

0

Because M = Θ/(1 − pa ):
0

lim Tw (pa ) = lim
Tw (M )
0

pa →1.0

M →∞

0

0

0

0

= lim
0

M eR/M (eTs /M − 1)

= lim
0

(eTs /M − 1)
0
M 0 −1 e−R/M

M →∞
0

M →∞

0

The limit of the numerator and the denominator are both zero. Therefore, L’Hôpital’s
Rule can be applied. This yields:
0 −2

0

0

lim Tw (M ) = lim
0

M 0 →∞

M →∞

0

= lim
0

M →∞

0

0

−Ts M eTs /M

0
0
−M 0 −2 e−R/M + M 0 −1 − RM 0 −2 e−R/M
0

0

−Ts eTs /M
0
0
−e−R/M − M 0 −1 Re−R/M

0

= Ts
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Appendix B
Proof of Maximum Number of
Similar Pages in a Checkpoint
This chapter establishes an upper bound on the number of similar pages that must
be included in a checkpoint. In Chapter 5, the examination focuses on a symmetric
difference algorithm (xor+lz4) and a simple similarity heuristic (neighbors). Showing
an upper-bound on the number of pages that must be retained in this instance is
straightforward. Here a more general problem is considered: asymmetric differences
and arbitrary associations between similar pages and the other pages in application
memory allocations.
The analysis begins with the construction of a graph of similar pages and their
relationships.
S = the set of similar pages in application allocated memory
R = the set of non-similar reference pages associated with the similar pages
As discussed in Chapter 5, every similar page, s ∈ S, is defined by a set of tuples,
D = {(d, p)}, where d is the value of the difference and p ∈ (S ∪ R) is the associated
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S0

S1

S2

S0

S1

S2

S5

S4

S3

R1

S4

S3

(a)

(b)

Figure B.1: Two hypothetical examples of the relationship between similar pages
(Si ) and non-similar reference pages (Ri ) in the memory of an application. The
directed edges represent computed differences. An edge from Si to Sj (or Ri to Sj )
indicates a difference that would allow Sj to be recreated from the reference page.
In B.1a, we would need to retain three similar pages, one from each cycle. In B.1b,
we would need to retain one similar page from cycle on the right hand side of the
figure.

reference page. Note that the reference page may be a similar page or it may be a
non-similar page. There is a vertex in the graph for each p ∈ (S ∪ R). For each
s ∈ S, I identify a tuple (d, p) such that for all (di , pi ) ∈ D, d ≤ di . In other words,
the smallest difference for each similar page is chosen. A directed edge from p to s
is then created in the graph.
Given this graph, G = (V, E) of similarity relationships, the analysis in this
chapter will demonstrate that no more than half of the similar pages must be included
in a checkpoint. The algorithm for identifying the set of similar pages that must be
retained in a checkpoint is as follows.

1. Remove all of the vertices s ∈ S that are reachable from r ∈ R.
2. Remove all of the vertices r ∈ R.
3. While there is at least one vertex v such that out-degree(v) = 0, remove v.
4. For each cycle in G, remove all but one vertex.
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Examining the implications of each step in this algorithm proves that after the
applying this algorithm, |V | ≤ 12 |S|.
1. All of the similar pages that can be reconstructed from zero, duplicate or
unique pages are removed from the graph. Chapter 5 describes how pages in
each category are captured in the compressed checkpoint. In the worst case,
this step removes no similar pages.
2. All non-similar pages can be independently reconstructed from the compressed
checkpoint. This step will never remove any similar pages from G.
3. As this graph is constructed, for all s ∈ S, in-degree(s) = 1. At this point, for
all v ∈ V, v ∈ S. In other words, the remaining vertices only represent similar
pages. Therefore:
X

out-degree(v) = |S|

v∈V

This property is invariant throughout this step of the algorithm. For each
vertex, v, that is removed in this step out-degree(v) = 0 and in-degree(v) = 1.
As a result, the total out-degree of G is reduced by 1 because removing v also
removes exactly one edge which reduces the out-degree of one of the remaining
vertices by 1. Removing v also reduces |S| by 1.
4. At the conclusion of the previous step, the following holds for every remaining
vertex, v:
out-degree(v) > 0 and
X
out-degree(v) = |S|
v∈V

Therefore, out-degree(v) = 1. By construction:
in-degree(v) = 1
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Because every vertex has an in-degree and an out-degree of 1, each vertex
must be part of a cycle. If one similar page is retained from each cycle, all
of the pages in the cycle can be reconstructed. And because the smallest
possible cycle consists of two vertices, no more than half of the similar pages
in application-allocated memory must be included in the checkpoint.

154

References
[1] bzip2. http://bzip.org.
[2] Extremely fast compression algorithm. https://github.com/Cyan4973/lz4.
[3] Hydrodynamics Challenge Problem, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.
Technical Report LLNL-TR-490254.
[4] November 2014 — TOP500 Supercomputer Sites. http://www.top500.org/
(visited March 2012).
[5] Top 500 Supercomputer Sites. http://www.top500.org/ (visited March 2012).
[6] SST: The structural simulation toolkit.
sstmacro.html, 2011.

http://sst.sandia.gov/about_

[7] Saurabh Agarwal, Rahul Garg, Meeta S. Gupta, and Jose E. Moreira. Adaptive
incremental checkpointing for massively parallel systems. In Proceedings of
the 18th Annual International Conference on Supercomputing, pages 277–286.
ACM, 2004.
[8] Sean Ahern, Arie Shoshani, Kwan-Liu Ma, Alok Choudhary, Terence
Critchlow, Scott Klasky, Valerio Pascucci, Jim Ahrens, Wes Bethel, Hank
Childs, et al. Scientific discovery at the exascale: report from the DOE ASCR
2011 workshop on exascale data management, analysis, and visualization, 2011.
[9] Lorenzo Alvisi, Elmootazbellah N. Elnozahy, Sriram Rao, Syed Amir Husain,
and Asanka de Mel. An analysis of communication induced checkpointing.
In Fault-Tolerant Computing, 1999. Digest of Papers. Twenty-Ninth Annual
International Symposium on, pages 242–249, 1999.
[10] Lorenzo Alvisi and Keith Marzullo. Message logging: Pessimistic, optimistic,
causal, and optimal. Software Engineering, IEEE Transactions on, 24(2):149–
159, 1998.

155

References
[11] Gene M. Amdahl. Validity of the single processor approach to achieving large
scale computing capabilities. In Proceedings of the April 18-20, 1967, Spring
Joint Computer Conference, AFIPS ’67 (Spring), pages 483–485, New York,
NY, USA, 1967. ACM.
[12] Andrea Arcangeli, Izik Eidus, and Chris Wright. Increasing memory density by
using KSM. In Proceedings of the Linux Symposium, 2009, Montreal, Quebec,
pages 19–28, 2009.
[13] Argonne National Laboratory. Argonne Leadership Computing Facility.
https://www.alcf.anl.gov/user-guides/mira-cetus-vesta, 2015.
[14] Steve Ashby, Pete Beckman, Jackie Chen, Phil Colella, Bill Collins, Dona
Crawford, Jack Dongarra, Doug Kothe, Rusty Lusk, Paul Messina, et al. The
opportunities and challenges of exascale computing. Summary Report of the
Advanced Scientific Computing Advisory Committee (ASCAC) Subcommittee,
pages 1–77, 2010.
[15] Guillaume Aupy, Yves Robert, Frédéric Vivien, and Dounia Zaidouni. Checkpointing algorithms and fault prediction. Journal of Parallel and Distributed
Computing, 74(2):2048–2064, 2014.
[16] Algirdas Avizienis and Jean-Claude Laprie. Dependable computing: From
concepts to design diversity. Proceedings of the IEEE, 74(5):629–638, 1986.
[17] John Bent, Garth Gibson, Gary Grider, Ben McClelland, Paul Nowoczynski,
James Nunez, Milo Polte, and Meghan Wingate. PLFS: a checkpoint filesystem
for parallel applications. In Proceedings of the Conference on High Performance
Computing Networking, Storage and Analysis, page 21. ACM, 2009.
[18] John Bent, Gary Grider, Brett Kettering, Adam Manzanares, Meghan McClelland, Aaron Torres, and Alfred Torrez. Storage challenges at Los Alamos
National Lab. In Mass Storage Systems and Technologies (MSST), 2012 IEEE
28th Symposium on, pages 1–5. IEEE, 2012.
[19] Eduardo Berrocal, Leonardo Bautista-Gomez, Sheng Di, Zhiling Lan, and
Franck Cappello. Lightweight silent data corruption detection based on runtime
data analysis for HPC applications. In Proceedings of the 24th International
Symposium on High-Performance Parallel and Distributed Computing, HPDC
’15, pages 275–278, 2015.
[20] Susmit Biswas, Bronis R. de Supinski, Martin Schulz, Diana Franklin, Timothy Sherwood, and Frederic T. Chong. Exploiting data similarity to reduce
memory footprints. In Proceedings of the 2011 IEEE International Parallel

156

References
& Distributed Processing Symposium, IPDPS ’11, pages 152–163, Washington,
DC, USA, 2011. IEEE Computer Society.
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